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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of our nation, United States armed forces
have fought "from the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli"
in almost every type of conflict imaginable. No matter where United
States forces have fought, however, the American people have nearly
always been certain that when their sons and daughters went in
harm's way, they did so under the command of United States generals
and admirals who took their orders from the President of the United
States.' Today, however, this article of faith has been challenged,
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1. The only noteworthy historical exceptions to this principle occurred during the World
Wars, when:
United States forces served under the command of non-American officers. French
Field Marshal Foch commanded allied forces in World War I. And in World War II,
United States forces in Africa served under [Great Britain's] Field Marshal Montgom-
ery. And [Great Britain's] Lord Mountbatten commanded allied forces fighting in the
Asian continent in the China-Burma-India theatre.
Defense Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service, Mar. 2,1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File (statement of Defense Department Spokesperson Bob Hall).
Prior to 1993 the only time the United States had placed a military unit under the direct
command of the United Nations was a small air transport unit in New Guinea in 1962. See
Steven A. Holmes, Clinton May Let U.S. Troops Serve Under U.N. Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1993, at Al (citing WILLIAM J. DtRcH, THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING (1993)). As
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and, indeed, as American forces have fought and died in Somalia, it
has become the subject of national debate. Given the long tradition
of exclusive United States control over United States forces, how has
command and control become a subject of controversy so quickly?
As with so many questions today, the answer originates in the fall
of communism. After nearly fifty years of global vigilance against the
Soviet threat, the United States seems no longer inclined to assume
the role of "global police force" for the post-cold war world. At the
same time, however, there remains a realization that traditional
isolationism is not possible, and that somehow the United States must
remain internationally engaged. As President Bill Clinton took office
in January 1993, many in the new Administration concluded that the
United States should provide increased support to the United Nations
in the hope that the United Nations might finally begin to fulfill its
potential as a guarantor of world peace.'
Both the United States and the United Nations quickly came to
realize, however, that if the United Nations were to play a larger role
in the maintenance of international peace and security, it would have
to pursue its increasingly challenging mandates more aggressively?
of March 2, 1993, the United States had "520 U.S. military personnel serving with U.N.
operations in seven different operational areas." Defense Department Regular Briefing, supra.
In addition to United Nations operations, the United States has "two battalions currently
assigned to the multinational force of observers organization in the Sinai, where the command
rotates among the nations contributing forces, with the exception of the United States." Id.
United States forces have long served under NATO command, although they have never fought
under NATO command.
2. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said:
America cannot be the world's policeman. We cannot be responsible for settling every
dispute or answering every alarm.... Our imperative is to develop international means
to contain and... prevent these conflicts before they erupt. Here it is critical that we
use the United Nations in the manner its founders intended, and there is high new
hope that this may take place.
Secretary of State Christopher Discusses Strategy, CNN, Mar. 22,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURRNT File; see also United States Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine
Albright Address to the International Women's Media Foundation, Reuter Transcript Report,
Apr. 19,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. ("[W]hether we like it or not,
the United States cannot walk away from [the] United Nations agenda.... The United Nations
needs us and we need it.... There simply is no other way.").
3. See Paul Lewis, United Nations is Developing Control Center to Coordinate Growing
Peacekeeping Role, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1993, at A10.
As the demand for peacekeeping has grown sharply, the Security Council seems more
willing to mount forceful interventions.... The Security Council is moving towards
greater interventionism because in many tragedies public opinion perceives a human
imperative that transcends everything else.... We are using more force because we
are encountering more resistance.
Id. (quoting United Nations Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi
Annan).
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In certain cases, this would require a military capability-a capability
that the United Nations does not have, and, to a large extent, that
only the United States can provide.4 Consequently, as the United
Nations sought to become more "muscular" and the United States
pursued internal renewal, a mutual security partnership seemed to
hold great promise.5
Following his inauguration, President Clinton took practical steps
to make this promise a reality. He authorized United States logistics
forces to serve under the command of the United Nations Operation
in Somalia (UNOSOM), in what many hoped would be a model for
future United States support.6 In addition, the President directed his
Administration to undertake a comprehensive review of United States
support for the United Nations, which produced a recommendation
from senior Administration policymakers that United States forces be
permitted to serve under the "operational control" of future United
Nations commands.7 While some expressed reservations with the
direction of Administration policy,' it seemed as if a new era was
beginning in the United States/United Nations security partnership.
Beneath the promise, however, was great uneasiness. As the
United Nations effort to capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah
Aidid floundered, criticism of the United Nations became more
frequent, particularly within the United States Congress. Influential
lawmakers from both political parties grew bolder in their calls for
clarification of the United States mission in Somalia.9 Thus, it came
4. R. Jeffrey Smith & Julia Preston, U.S. Plans Wider Role in U.N. Peacekeeping, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1993, at Al (quoting United Nations officials as acknowledging the United
Nations's need for United States help). See generally THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS (1992).
5. Madeleine Albright, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, has described
the United States's commitment to employing military force in concert with other nations under
United Nations authority as "assertive multilateralism." Smith & Preston, supra note 4, at Al.
6. IL
7. Barton Gellman, Wider U.N. Police Role Supported, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,1993, at Al
(noting restraints in the resulting presidential directive which temper somewhat the previous
campaign commitments made by President Clinton); Holmes, supra note 1, at Al; Elaine
Sciolino, U.S. Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at AS.
8. See, e.g., Robert C. Byrd, The Perils of Peacekeeping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,1993, at A23
(Senator Byrd's criticism of Administration plans to place United States troops under foreign
command); Ronald A. Taylor, Foreign Command of U.S. Peacekeepers Debated, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 1993, at A3 (quoting senators opposed to the idea of placing United States troops
under foreign comand).
9. Bill Gertz, Nunn Questions Somalia Mission, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27,1993, at Al; Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Vows to Stay in Somalia Force Despite an Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at
1993]
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as little surprise that the President struck a decidedly conservative
tone during his first address to the United Nations General Assembly
in September 1993, when he proclaimed that the "United Nations
simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts.
If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the
United Nations must know when to say no."10
In a news conference following his address to the General
Assembly, the President outlined a new and rigorous set of precondi-
tions upon which he would insist before allowing United States
participation in a peacekeeping force in the Balkans." Several
weeks later, following media reports of dead United States
servicemembers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the
President continued to distance himself from the United Nations by
announcing that United States troops will participate in United
Nations operations only if they serve under a United States chain of
command. 2
While the President's new conservatism toward the United
Nations may reflect a degree of prudent realism, it leaves unanswered
several fundamental questions regarding the future of the United
States participation in United Nations operations. Given the
President's commitment to an increased United Nations role in world
affairs, further United States participation in United Nations
operations seems likely. However, if the United States reserves the
right to go its own way during these missions, what will prevent other
nations from doing the same? Moreover, who will define the political
objectives for these missions? Who will make the crucial strategic
decisions required to translate political objectives into military reality?
Who will command the forces required to execute strategic decisions?
Al.
10. President Bill Clinton Addresses the General Assembly of the United Nations, Federal
News Service, White House Briefing, Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File.
11. Thomas Friedman, Clinton, at U.N., Lists Stiff Terms For Sending U.S. Force to Bosnia,
N.Y. TlMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at Al, A16; Carla Anne Robbins, Clinton Rethinks U.S. Global
Peacekeeping Role, Draws New Criteria for Joining U.N.-Led Missions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
1993, at A24.
12. See David Lauter & Paul Richter, Clinton to Insist on U.S. Control of GIs in U.N. Roles,
L.A. TIMES (Wash. ed.), Oct. 15, 1993, at 1.
My [President Clinton's] experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about
having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all
about what the range of decisions were, which could be made by a command other
than an American command with direct accountability to the United States.
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Ultimately, the fundamental concerns in United Nations
headquarters and in Washington revolve around authori-
ty-speciically, the authority to make the political, strategic, and
operational decisions that together comprise the right to command
and control United Nations forces. If the United Nations is to fulfill
its promise of peace, these questions must be addressed. This Article
explores how these concerns might be reconciled within the frame-
work of the United Nations Charter to create a contemporary and
more enduring regime for the command and control of United
Nations forces.
As Part II demonstrates, command and control issues are not
new to the United Nations; indeed, in 1945 the signatories to the
United Nations Charter created a model for the command and control
of United Nations forces. While the cold war ensured that this model
was never used, it remains the necessary point of departure for any
current discussion of United Nations command and control. As
discussed in Part III, this Charter model was originally replaced by
systems of command and control which evolved to meet the needs of
two quite distinct United Nations missions: large-scale enforcement
and peacekeeping. Though these command and control regimes
evolved outside the Charter's express constitutional framework, they
have arguably been the only alternatives available given the cold war
context in which they developed.
The end of the cold war, however, has blurred the once clear
distinction between the enforcement and peacekeeping missions. As
described in Part IV, a new mission has emerged with characteristics
of both enforcement and peacekeeping. This new "peace enforce-
ment" mission requires that United Nations forces attempt to
maintain neutrality between disputants much as they would in a
peacekeeping operation, but that they also be prepared to use force
against any disputant who breaches the peace, much as they would in
an enforcement action. While the fundamental characteristics of the
new peace enforcement missions have become reasonably clear, a
command and control regime to govern these missions has not, as
evidenced by the series of command arrangements that have evolved
throughout the course of the United Nations intervention in Somalia.
In addition, the United Nations and members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) struggled throughout 1993 to reach
agreement on the command and control arrangements for a potential
peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia.
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One school of thought argues that the United Nations must
control missions conducted in its name, while another argues that ad
hoc coalitions between the United States and certain member states,
in which participating states maintain control over their national
contingents, are better suited to the current capabilities of the United
Nations. While the Clinton Administration appears to have adopted
the latter view, the question remains whether reliance on these ad hoc
arrangements is sound policy for the long term. Part IV acknowledg-
es the advantages of the ad hoc approach, but also considers how it
ultimately leaves both the United States and the United Nations
vulnerable.
Part V begins by examining recent efforts within the United
Nations Secretariat to improve the United Nations's ability to oversee
operations conducted in its name, as well as the Clinton
Administration's attempt to fashion a new policy toward the United
Nations. While many of the changes currently in progress are positive
as far as they go, they do not address the complex issues underlying
the current debate over command and control. Moreover, the current
proposals have been initiated with little reference to the original
Charter model for command and control. Part V evaluates this
development, and suggests that both the United Nations and its
member states might benefit from a return to a more structured,
Charter-based model for command and control: a contemporary
model that incorporates the strengths of the system envisioned in 1945
without ignoring the experiences of intervening years. Part V offers
suggestions for creating such a "neo-Charter" model, and proposes
that it might serve as the necessary confidence-building mechanism
through which the United Nations, the United States, and other key
member states might work to forge a security partnership adequate
for the changed political and military demands of the post-cold war
world.
II. THE CHARTER VISION FOR UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND AND CONTROL
When the international community founded the United Nations
in 1945, it hoped to create a system of collective security to ensure
that no state could ever again drive the world to war.13 The signato-
ries to the United Nations Charter expected that an essential element
13. See, e.g., LELAND M. GOODRICH-& EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 6-10, 22-44 (2d ed. 1949).
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of the new collective security system would be a network of national
military contingents that together would comprise the United Nations
armed forces.'4 While the cold war rendered this plan irrelevant, it
remains the only coherent vision agreed upon for the creation,
command, and control of a universal military capability. As such, it
is the necessary starting point for any discussion of the contemporary
possibilities for a United Nations command and control regime.
A. The Security Council's Responsibility for Political Control over
United Nations Forces
The United Nations Security Council was designed as the
bulwark of the United Nations's experiment in collective security.
The Security Council was given "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security,"' 5 and United
Nations member states agreed to abide by Security Council decisions
concerning such matters. 6 The signatories hoped that the Security
Council would encourage the "pacific settlement of disputes."' 7 If
such efforts failed, however, the Security Council was expected to rely
on its authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Chapter VII gives the Security Council a range of options for
responding to any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression."' 8 The Security Council is authorized to call on dispu-
tants to comply with "provisional measures" such as negotiations or
a cease-fire. Alternatively, the Security Council may make
nonbinding recommendations to member states regarding action they
should take to restrain disputants, or may render binding decisions on
the proper course of action, including the use of military force."
To enhance the Security Council's ability to apply military force
in furtherance of United Nations principles, the signatories authorized
the Security Council to establish a United Nations armed force under
14. Id. at 29, 35-36; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 26.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
16. Id. arts. 25, 48, para. 1.
17. Id. ch. VI.
18. Id. art. 39.
19. Id. art. 40. The Security Council may enforce its decisions without using armed force
by employing measures such as the severance of diplomatic relations or the interruption of
commerce or communication with an offending state. Id. art. 41. If the Security Council
determines that such measures have been or will be inadequate, it may take whatever military
action "may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id. art. 42.
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Article 43,' and gave the Security Council responsibility for making
plans for the application of the armed forces it controlled.21 In
addition, national contingents comprising the force were to be kept
available for the Security Council "on its call."'  Once forces were
deployed, the Military Staff Committee, under the Security Council,
would be responsible for their strategic direction.' In short, the
signatories intended the Security Council to exercise complete
political control over any forces operating under its authority. Given
the Security Council's plenary authority in all matters of peace and
security, it is no surprise that the signatories intended that the
Security Council exercise the international community's authority over
international armed forces.
B. The Military Staff Committee's Responsibilities
Because the Security Council was a civilian political organ, the
signatories foresaw a need for professional military assistance. Having
observed the World War II defeat of the Axis Powers by the largest
multinational military effort in history, the signatories envisioned that
postwar peace would be maintained through similar cooperation at
the highest military levels,24 and the desire to institutionalize this
cooperation resulted in the creation of the Military Staff Commit-
tee?
The signatories envisioned several functions for the Military Staff
Committee.' The Military Staff Committee was responsible for
20. Id. art. 43, para. 1. Although the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
considered creating a standing United Nations army, they ultimately decided against such a plan.
See ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR SECURITY 140-42 (1990). Instead, the signatories settled on
a plan authorizing the Security Council to enter into "special agreements" with member states
that would guarantee the availability of "armed forces, facilities, and assistance." Id. at 156.
These Article 43 forces would be composed of national contingents and would be available to
the Security Council at all times. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. The special agreements would
specify the "numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the
nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." Id. para. 2.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
22. Id. art. 43, para. 1.
23. Id. art. 47, para. 3.
24. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 44,50-56,58,
92, 470-72 (1958).
25. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 1. The Military Staff Committee consists of the Chiefs
of Staff (or their representatives) of the five permanent members of the Security Council: the
United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and China. Id. art. 47, para. 2; GOODRICH &
HAMBRO, supra note 13, at 48.
26. U.N. CHARTER arts. 46, 47, paras. 1, 3-4.
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"advising and assisting" the Security Council on all questions relating
to "military requirements,"'27 and was expected to assist the Security
Council in making "[p]lans for the application of armed force."'
Together, these provisions gave the Military Staff Committee an
important role both in creating United Nations forces and in
determining how they might be used.
The Charter also gave the Military Staff Committee an important
role once United Nations forces were committed to combat. The
Military Staff Committee was to "advise and assist" the Security
Council on the "employment and command of forces placed at [the
Security Council's] disposal."29  In addition, the Military Staff
Committee was made responsible, under the direction of the Security
Council, for the "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the
disposal of the Security Council."3
While the precise meaning of "strategic direction" is not obvious
from the Charter text, some insight into the term can be gained by
considering the World War II function of the Allied Combined Chiefs
of Staff, which served as the model for the Military Staff Commit-
tee.3 During World War II, the British and American service chiefs
consulted with each other on a daily basis regarding the broad
objectives of the war.32 After establishing a common position on a
given issue, they would make a recommendation to their respective
civilian leaders. In turn, they would translate political direction
received from the civilian leadership into a military plan that was
conveyed to the operating forces for execution.33
Considered in this context, it seems clear that the term "strategic
direction" was meant to describe a process in which the Military Staff
Committee would serve as a vital link in the chain of command
between the Security Council and an operational commander. After
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 1; see also id. art. 45 (noting a role for the Military Staff
Committee in the negotiation of special agreements under Article 43).
28. Id. art. 46. Additionally, the Military Staff Committee was made responsible for "the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." Id. art. 47, para. 1. Presently, however,
the Committee's arms control functions have largely been taken over by other agencies and
organs. See RALPH M. GOLDMAN, IS rr Tam TO RE vwE THE UN MILITARY STAFF
CoMMrrFE? 6 (Occasional Paper Series of the Ctr. for the Study of Armament and
Disarmament, Cal. State Univ., L.A., No. 19, 1990).
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 1.
30. Id. art. 47, para. 3.
31. GOODRIcH & HAMBRO, supra note 13, at 290; see also RUSSELL, supra note 24, at 472
(explaining the British concept of the Military Staff Committee).
32. WiNsToN S. CHURCHILL, TIm GRAND ALLIANCE 686-87 (1950).
33. Id. at 687.
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considering the views of the operational commander, the Military
Staff Committee would offer military advice to the Security Council;
similarly, after a Security Council decision, the Military Staff
Committee would translate Security Council political objectives into
a military plan, which would be conveyed to commanders in the field
for execution.'
The Military Staff Committee was not expected to be involved in
"command," which referred to the operational or tactical control of
forces in the field.3' The Charter drafters agreed that no committee
could exercise this function and that an individual was better suited
to making the numerous and detailed decisions required in a tactical
environment.36 Thus, when Article 47(3) provided that questions
relating to the command of United Nations forces were to be "worked
out subsequently,, 37 it did so not because the drafters were unable
to agree on the meaning of "command," but because they were
unable to agree on a mechanism for selecting commanders.38  By
default, therefore, they agreed that selection of individual command-
ers would turn on the requirements of each case.39
In February 1946 the Security Council ordered the Military Staff
Committee to develop a plan for implementing Article 43 as its first
task.' Despite significant differences on other issues, the Military
Staff Committee was generally of one mind on questions of command
and control.41 The resulting Military Staff Committee report to the
Security Council recommended that United Nations forces remain
34. See D.W. BOwmr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 359 (1964) (defining strategic direction
as "the translation of... political directives into military terms"); see also Crisis in the Persian
Gulf. Sanctions, Diplomacy and War: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services,
101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 539 (1991). Planning, establishment of objectives and deployment are not
decided in a vacuum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff just sitting over in the Pentagon or by the
commanders in the field. They flow directly from political decisions and national security
strategy. Id. (statement of General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
35. See, e.g., FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND
WAR 30 (1966).
36. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 13, at 291-92.
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 3.
38. See, eg., HILDERBRAND, supra note 20, at 157-58.
39. Id.
40. 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 423, U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18.
41. See generally Report of the Military Staff Committee, General Principles Governing the
Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations
of the United Nations [hereinafter Military Staff Committee Report], U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1),
U.N. Doc. S/336 (1947), reprinted in 1946-47 U.N.Y.B., supra note 40, at 424-43.
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under exclusive national command "except when operating under the
Security Council."'42
Once called by the Security Council, the forces would "come
under the control of the Security Council," and the "Military Staff
Committee shall be responsible, under the Security Council, for their
strategic direction."'43 The Military Staff Committee also agreed that
"command of national contingents will be exercised by commanders
appointed by the respective Member Nations,"44 and that the
Security Council could appoint a supreme or overall commander. The
Military Staff Committee was unable, however, to agree unilaterally
on whether the Security Council should also appoint commanders in
chief of air, sea, and land forces acting under the supreme command-
er.
45
C. The Chapter VII Model
As the foregoing demonstrates, Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter provided a relatively clear model for the command
and control of United Nations forces. Subject to Security Council
approval, the Military Staff Committee was expected to determine the
military requirements of a United Nations force and to develop plans
necessary for its effective deployment. The Security Council was
given political control over the force to ensure its consistency with the
international community's desires. Once forces were deployed, the
Military Staff Committee was charged with providing strategic
direction, i.e., advising political leadership and translating the Security
Council's political direction into military objectives, while command
would be exercised by a single military officer in the theater of
operation.
Other disagreements within the Military Staff Committee that
prevented implementation of Article 43 foreshadowed the larger
divisions between the Soviets and their western counterparts that soon
eliminated any hope of the Security Council becoming an instrument
of global collective security. In the years that followed, United
Nations forces Would respond to breaches of the peace; however, they
would be organized and controlled in a fashion much different from
that anticipated in 1945.
42. Military Staff Committee Report, supra note 41, art. 36.
43. Id. arts. 37, 38.
44. Id. art. 39.
45. See id art. 41.
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M. TWO MISSIONS, THREE MODELS:
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL
DURING THE COLD WAR
A. Command and Control in Enforcement Actions
Despite the fact that the Security Council authorized only two
enforcement actions during the forty-five year period from 1947 to
1992,1 the operations against North Korea and Iraq provide a useful
basis for generalization about the command and control of United
Nations forces during large-scale enforcement actions.
1. Political Control and Strategic Direction.
a. The Korean conflict. Within hours of North Korea's invasion
of South Korea in June 1950, the United States requested that the
Security Council demand an immediate North Korean withdrawal
north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel.47 North Korea's refusal to
comply resulted in a Security Council resolution recommending that
member states take action "necessary to repel the armed attack and
to restore international peace and security in the area."'  In Security
Council Resolution 84, the Security Council recommended that all
members pursue the previously declared objective by providing
military forces to a unified command under the United States.49
None of the resolutions provided for Security Council control over the
ensuing operation, despite the fact that it would be conducted under
Security Council authorization. In effect, the Security Council had
46. Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 66 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
47. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc. SINF/5/Rev.1 (1950).
48. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950).
49. Security Council Resolution 84 of July 7, 1950, provided that:
[The Security Council], [h]aving recommended that Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area ....
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance
pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other
assistance available to a unified commander under the United States of America;
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag
in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of
the various nations participating;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as
appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.
S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950).
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given the United States an open-ended objective and complete
authority with which to achieve it.5' During the negotiations
preceding authorization of the unified command, Secretary General
Trygve Lie had proposed a "Committee on co-ordination of Assis-
tance for Korea," consisting of troop contributing states and the
Republic of Korea. As described by Lie:
The explicit purpose of the Committee was to stimulate and coordi-
nate offers of [personnel and material to the United Nations effort].
Its deeper purpose was to keep the United Nations "in the picture.
." The delegates of the United Kingdom, France, and Norway
liked the idea of such a committee; the United States Mission
promptly turned thumbs down. The Pentagon was much op-
posed.51
Once the United States indicated that it would not accept direction
from this committee, it persuaded the British and French to introduce
Resolution 84.52
Soon after its expansive grant of authority to the United States,
the Security Council was immobilized by the return of the Soviet
Union, which had been boycotting Security Council proceedings. 3
Ironically, the Soviet return ensured that de facto and de jure political
control over the United Nations Command remained vested in the
United States, as there was no other United Nations organ legally
entitled to assert political control over the operation.'
From the outset of the Korean conflict, the United States
exercised both political control and strategic direction over the
operation:
[T]he United Nations Command took its orders from the United
States Government, as the Unified Command, and not from the
50. The Security Council did, however, request that the United States file reports "as
appropriate." Id. para. 6.
51. TRYGvE LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 334 (1954). But see Letter From the United
States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, in [7 Korea]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950,
at 306-07 (1950) (describing how the British and French shared the United States view that the
Security Council's role in overseeing the course of combat should be minimal). While Anglo-
French support of Lie's proposal and opposition to Security Council involvement are not
necessarily inconsistent, it is possible that the British and French either initially supported Lie's
proposal and were subsequently persuaded by the United States to back away from all forms
of active United Nations oversight, or may have acknowledged Lie's proposal all along.
52. See U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.476 (1950) (statement of
Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom).
53. SEYERSTED, supra note 35, at 34.
54. [2 Asia] ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967, DOCUMENTS
AND COMMENTARY 178-79 (1970).
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United Nations, nor from the other States contributing forces or
from any common organ (committee) of these. The United States
Government, for its part, did not take orders from anybody,
although it did consult and seek political guidance from the United
Nations and from some of the states contributing forces. The
United Nations did not interfere at all in the purely military aspects
of the operations. And even in political matters it confined itself
to making "recommendations." 5
This United States dominance of strategic decision-making
proceeded smoothly until the North Koreans had been driven north
across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and the unified command faced the
difficult decision whether or not to pursue a complete North Korean
defeat or to stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel to allow pursuit of a
negotiated settlement.56 The Secretary General, as well as certain
nonaligned states, were opposed to immediately pressing the conflict
beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel.' Once again, however, the
United States prevailed, with a clear endorsement from the General
Assembly.58 The ensuing decision to cross the Thirty-eighth Parallel
led to Chinese intervention in the conflict and a series of difficult
choices regarding the pursuit of opposition aircraft across the
Manchurian border, the bombing of Yalu River bridges, the wisdom
of involving Chinese nationalist troops, and the imposition of an
economic and arms blockade on China.59 The conflict eventually
ended in a military and political stalemate.'
Would more assertive political direction by nonaligned and
Western states have changed the outcome in Korea? This is difficult
to say. Indeed, despite an occasional difference of opinion with the
55. SEYERSTED, supra note 35, at 41; see also RUTH B. RUSSELL, UNITED NATIONS
EXPERIENCE WITH MILIrARY FORCES: POLmCAL AND LEGAL ASPECts 31 (1964), quoting
LELAND M. GOODRICH, KOREA: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE UNITED
NATIONS 121 (1956).
General MacArthur regarded himself as acting primarily in the role of Commander-in-
Chief of United States forces in the Far East. His connection with the United Nations
he viewed as largely nominal. Direct controls over him were purely American.... The
reports to the United Nations on military operations in Korea, while prepared in the
first instance by General MacArthur as a matter of procedure, were subject to revision
by his superiors in Washington and were presented to the Security Council by the
United States representative on the Security Council.
Id.
56. See HIGGINS, supra note 54, at 256-57.
57. See MAX HARRELSON, FIRES ALL AROUND THE HORIZON 49-50 (1989).
58. G.A. Res. 376(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
The final vote was forty-seven in favor, five opposed, and seven abstentions. 1950 U.N.Y.B. 265,
U.N. Sales No. 1951.1.24.
59. BowE=r, supra note 34, at 45.
60. See generally HIGGINS, supra note 54, at 251-309.
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Secretary General and certain nonaligned states, the United States
received generally consistent support for its actions.61 Nonetheless,
the pattern of United States dominance and United Nations acquies-
cence led one commentator to remark that, from a United Nations
perspective, the "weakness of strategic and political control is perhaps
the most significant fact that emerges ... about the use of United
Nations Forces [in Korea]."'62 Indeed, in hindsight, one might argue
that a more genuine multinational structure for exercising political
control might have actually served the United States interests as
well.
b. The Persian Gulf War. Forty years later, the Security
Council again authorized member states to use force against an
aggressor-this time against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait.
While there is little about the ultimate outcome of the Persian Gulf
conflict that resembles the stalemate in Korea, the two operations
have important similarities from a command and control perspective.
As in the Korean conflict, the Security Council established a
broad objective and authorized member states wide latitude in
achieving it. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized member
states to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement [the Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait] and.., to restore international peace and
security in the area."'  Resolution 678 did not, however, provide for
political control by the Security Council, requesting only that "the
States concerned.., keep the Security Council regularly informed on
the progress of actions undertaken."'
Unlike the Korean conflict, the United States and its coalition
partners won a decisive military victory against Iraq. On balance, the
61. See id. at 195-308.
62. BowErr, supra note 34, at 45.
63. As one commentator noted, "an earlier effort on the part of the United States ... to
see that its direction of military operations reflected the consensus of the participating members,
would have usefully enhanced the international character of the operation, as well as protected
the Government against criticism when things went wrong." RUSSELL, supra note 55, at 38.
64. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
65. Id. at 2. See Bums H. Weston, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
Relations Law, Continued. Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516,525-28 (1991) (stating that the Security Council
gave the United States carte blanche to conduct the war); Eugene V. Rostow, Agora: The Gulf
Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action
or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 509 (1991) ("During the period of active
hostilities, neither the Secretary-General nor any other part of the United Nations Secretariat
attempted to exercise control over military operations.").
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ad hoc coalition working under broad United Nations authorization
worked well as military objectives were defined with minimum
disagreement.' No doubt an important factor in maintaining unity
until the operation's conclusion was the decision of the United States
not to pursue Iraqi forces deep into Iraq after driving them from
Kuwait. While United States leaders later defended this decision
against domestic criticism partially on the grounds that the United
Nations had not authorized such action,' it is likely that the cease-
fire decision was motivated more by diplomatic and long-term
domestic political concerns than any legal constraint in Resolution
67 8.' Resolution 678's authorization to "restore international peace
and security in the area" 69 could have been interpreted to permit
aggressive pursuit to Baghdad,' just as similar language served as
the basis for crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel in Korea.71
Whatever its motivation, the United States avoided any Thirty-
eighth Parallel-type disagreements with the United Nations with
regard to termination of the Persian Gulf War. Such was not the case
in January 1993, however, when United States cruise missile attacks
on Baghdad led to criticism of United States actions not only from
former partners in the United States-assembled anti-Iraq coalition, but
from other Security Council members as well. 2 While much of the
controversy surrounding this attack arose because it was conducted
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 688 73 -a resolution that did
not expressly authorize the use of force-it also served as a reminder
of the lesson learned in Korea: whenever the United Nations
66. See, eg., UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCr OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS app. 493-501 (1992); Rone Tempest & Kim Murphy,
Western, Arab Allies Stand Firmly Behind United States Ultimatum to Baghdad, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1991, at As. But see Leonard Doyle, United Nations 'has no role in running war,' THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 11, 1991, at 2 (describing former United Nations Secretary General Javier
Perez de Cuellar's misgivings about the Security Council's lack of an oversight role despite
United Nations authorization).
67. See H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, IT DOESN'T TAKE A HERO 497-98 (1992).
68. Weston, supra note 65, at 534.
69. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 64, at 1.
70. Schachter, supra note 46, at 65, 74-75; Weston, supra note 65, at 525.
71. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/INF/5/Rev. 1 (1950); see
also Bruce Russett & James Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Spring
1991, at 69, 76.
72. See Leonard Doyle, Confrontation with Iraq: U.N. Sees Baghdad's Point of View, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 20, 1993, at 8; Julia Preston, United States Raids Test U.N.'s Crisis Power,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1993, at A23.
73. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
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subcontracts its enforcement responsibilities, there will always be
potential for disagreement over strategic ends and tactical means.
2. Command and Composition of Forces.
a. The Korean conflict. Following creation of the unified
command in Korea on July 7, 1950, President Harry S Truman
immediately named General Douglas MacArthur as the commander
for all United Nations forces in Korea.74 Ultimately, sixteen nations
fought under the United Nations flag." National units were inte-
grated into United States divisions in an effort to ensure both
effective operational command as well as an effective logistics and
supply line.76 While the chain of command from President Truman
to General MacArthur was essentially identical to what one would
expect for a unilateral United States operation, lower level com-
mands, particularly the Eighth Army command in Tokyo, were
multinational in character." The senior military representative of
each participating member state was granted direct access to General
MacArthur on "matters of major policy affecting the operational
capabilities of the forces concerned."79
b. The Persian Gulf War. While the United States was the
leader of the campaign to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait, theater
command relationships were more complex than those in Korea, due
primarily to United States dependence on Saudi Arabia and its
regional neighbors for basing and political support. Immediately
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States entered into
consultations with Saudi Arabia that resulted in Saudi authorization
for the United States to establish a defensive presence on Saudi
soil.' From the beginning, a dual command structure was estab-
lished. United States forces were commanded by President George
74. HIGGINS, supra note 54, at 195-96 (noting that General MacArthur's appointment was
not made subject to United Nations approval).
75. SEYERSTED, supra note 35, at 35.
76. Id. at 33-44.
77. Id. at 34-36. The chain of command ran from the President down through the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and General MacArthur.
The United States Eighth Army fell under the command of General MacArthur and
incorporated the ground forces contributed by all participating members and the Republic of
Korea, the Far Eastern Air Force, and the Seventh United States Fleet (including naval units
contributed by members).
78. Id. at 35-36.
79. Id. at 36.
80. SCHWARZKOPF, supra note 67, at 302-08.
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Bush, with the United States Central Command exercising command
in the theater. Islamic forces participated under Saudi operational
command." The dual chains of command were coordinated through
a joint headquarters and operations center where the United States
and Saudi commanders, along with their staffs, worked closely to
ensure a coordinated approach.' Participating British and French
units remained under the political control of their respective national
command authorities, but their units operated under the tactical
control of both the Americans and Saudis.'
3. The Single-State and Managed-Coalition Models. As the
foregoing demonstrates, command and control arrangements for the
United Nations's two major enforcement actions differed sharply from
the model envisioned in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Security Council political control over both the Korean and Persian
Gulf operations was limited to initial authorization-an arrangement
due in large measure to political divisions within the Security Coun-
cil' as well as military exigencies created by the invasions by well-
armed aggressor states. Because the United States was the only state
that could provide the necessary military capability, the United States
filled the political vacuum as well.
The similarities between the Korean and Persian Gulf command
and control arrangements, however, should not obscure their
important differences. While the United States made what were
essentially unilateral political and strategic decisions in Korea, similar
decisions were made with respect to the Persian Gulf only after
considerable consultation with the coalition partners. While General
MacArthur dominated the decision-making process in the Korean
theater of operations, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's relationship
81. As was noted at the time:
The initial agreement allowing the entry of U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia provided for
"strategic direction" of U.S. forces by the Saudi Military Command .... "Strategic
direction" was never defined. After researching precedents, [United States Central
Command] CENTCOM assumed the phrase to mean general guidance at a strategic
level with no actual command authority.
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEFENSE, supra note 66, app. at 493.
82. Id. app. at 494, 497.
83. See id. app. at 501-05; see also Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: United States Policy
Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Comt. on Armed Services, 101st Cong.,
2d. Sess. 688-89 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Persian Gulf Hearing] (testimony of General Colin
Powell) ("[T]here is not a single command and control structure... [; however,] coordination
mechanisms that are in place would provide an effective command control system.").
84. These political divisions were less pervasive during the Persian Gulf conflict. See
Rostow, supra note 65, at 508-10.
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with his coalition counterparts was more collaborative. Finally, while
there is little evidence that the fifteen nations participating with the
United States in Korea had a significant impact on the ultimate
outcome,' it is likely that the United States effort in the Gulf would
have been more challenging, if not impossible, without the support of
its coalition partners.'
Thus, what emerges from the Korean and Persian Gulf conflicts
are two similar, but distinct, models for United Nations command and
control. The Korean conflict provides a "single-state" model in which
the United Nations, after authorizing an operation, allows a dominant
state to exercise political control, strategic direction, and operational
command over forces which are provided by a single state acting
alone or at the head of a nominally multinational coalition. The
Persian Gulf conflict provides a "managed-coalition" model in which
the United Nations, after authorizing the operation, allows a dominant
state, such as the United States, to manage-but not dictate-political,
strategic, and command decisions through an ad hoc and truly
multinational coalition.
For the United Nations the primary advantage of the single-state
model is its ability to provide an immediate and effective military
response to a well-armed aggressor.' There will no doubt be
situations in which a particular state may find such a military
operation to its own advantage. However, the potential disadvantages
of the single-state model are significant, not the least of which is that
the single state stands to incur the majority of casualties. Likewise,
the lack of multinational participation may contribute to a perception
that the single state has ulterior motives for participating, with such
perceptions potentially leading to adverse domestic and international
85. In Korea it is estimated that the United States provided 50 percent of the ground forces,
86 percent of the naval forces, and 93 percent of the air forces. BowEr, supra note 34, at 40.
86. See Operation Desert ShieldlDesert Stonrn: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1991) (statement of General Schwarzkopf) (noting that
defeat of Iraq would have been "a far greater challenge" without cooperation from regional
partners); Senate Persian Gulf Hearing, supra note 83, at 645-46 (statement of Richard Cheney,
Secretary of Defense) (describing logistical contributions of various coalition partners); see also
John Omicinski, How Stands the Coalition?, Gannett News Service, Jan. 24, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (describing significant operational contributions of coalition
partners).
87. See Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 74 (noting that the advantages of the single-
state intervention in Korea included the "expeditious action to resist aggression, ... the
unambiguous command structure needed for large-scale field operations, a practical way to meet
the responsibilities of the United Nations .... and validation of the concept of collective
security").
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political consequences. Finally, unilateral decisions may sometimes
not be as wise as collectively reached decisions.
From a single state's perspective, the managed-coalition model
addresses many of these issues by allowing the militarily capable state
to project power while sharing, at least to a degree, the political and
military risks inherent in single-state intervention. Coalitions,
however, are rarely built without a price. In addition to making a
considerable diplomatic effort to assemble and maintain the coali-
tion,' the coalition manager is usually required to make a predomi-
nant commitment of personnel and material to the operation itself.89
While this may be acceptable in a conflict in which the coalition
manager's vital interests are threatened, it is less acceptable in a
conflict in which a prospective coalition manager's vital interests are
not so clear.
From the perspective of the United Nations, the primary
difficulty with both models is the extent to which they divest the
Security Council of control over United Nations operations. The state'
in command may interpret United Nations goals differently from that
of other Security Council members, or its aims may become more
expansive in the course of the operation. "[M]any U.N. members will
not view the military action as an appropriate application of collective
security if the action appears to conflict with the Security Council's
goals. '
'59
In addition, an operation may become identified with the policies
of the state leading the effort rather than with the policies of the
88. See Arming the United Nations Security Council-the Collective Security Participation
Resolution, S.J. Res. 325: Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Relations United States Senate,
102d Cong., 2d. Sess. at S9853 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Article 43 Hearing] (statement of
Senator Biden) ("The commitments garnered from our allies in the Persian Gulf did not come
without at least implied commitments on economic and political fronts."); Weston, supra note
65, at 523-24 (describing commitments made by the United States to secure support of various
states during the Persian Gulf War); see also Alan K. Henrikson, How Can the Vision of'A New
World Order' be Realized?, 16 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 63, 78 (1992) ("The critical
question... is whether a U.S.-led international enforcement action ever could be repeated. The
costs... will be staggering.").
89. Without such a commitment, a prospective coalition manager's claim to authority likely
would be diminished. Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88, at S9854. Regarding the
proposed relationship between the authority of the coalition manager and the amount of forces
provided by the manager, see BOWETr, supra note 34, at 40 ("[IThe predominance of United
States military assistance [in Korea] made the establishment of a Unified Command under the
United States a logical step."). See, eg., Senate Persian Gulf Hearing, supra note 83, at 703
(statement of Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense) ("There is no question ... that the bulk
of the military capability in the Gulf is U.S. force.").
90. Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 76.
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United Nations,9' which gives rise to two negative consequences.
First, in a particular conflict, a clever aggressor may avoid the full
force of international condemnation by raising concerns about the
single state's or coalition manager's objectives. Second, in a more
general sense, the United Nations's credibility and reputation for
evenhandedness are jeopardized if it appears to be a front for national
objectives.
B. Command and Control in Peacekeeping Operations
While hostility between the great powers blocked development
of the collective security system envisioned in Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, it nonetheless provided an alternative type
of stability as the superpowers managed many conflicts within their
bipolar order.' The United Nations quickly discovered, however,
that despite the dominance of the superpowers, these countries were
unable or unwilling to supervise all conflicts and that a multinational
alternative was necessary. A partial answer was found in the concept
of peacekeeping.
Although peacekeeping is not mentioned in the United Nations
Charter and peacekeeping doctrines have not been codified in an
international convention, the effort has nonetheless developed
distinctive characteristics. Peacekeeping operations have traditionally
involved the deployment of international military and civilian
personnel to help control international conflicts or internal conflicts
with potential international consequences.93  Once deployed,
peacekeepers have monitored cease-fires and provided a buffer
91. In addition to potential disadvantages for the single state, this model has potential
disadvantages for the United Nations as well. As described by Russett and Sutterlin, the
disadvantages of the single-state intervention in Korea were that:
[t]he United Nations lacked control or influence over the course of military action or
the precise purposes for which it was exercised.... The military operation became
identified with the policy of the nation leading the effort rather than with the United
Nations. ... Divisive forces within the United Nations were encouraged by the
dominant role of one member state pursuing goals not universally shared.
Id. at 74.
92. See, eg., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Maintaining International Peace and Security: The
United Nations as Forn and Focal Poin Remarks Before the American Publishers Association,
Federal News Service, Mar. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
93. See INDAR JIT RIKRYE, THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF PEACEKEEPING 1-4 (1984);
see also Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland. The Case for United Nations
Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 71
(1990).
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between hostile countries by establishing a zone of disengagement. 94
Peacekeeping deployments have traditionally been made only with the
consent of all parties involved, and, once deployed, the lightly armed
peacekeeping forces have used force only in self-defense.95
Just as distinct command and control models evolved in response
to the needs of large-scale enforcement missions, a command and
control model also evolved in response to the requirements of the
peacekeeping mission.
1. Political Control: The Roles of the Security Council and
Secretary General. Due to its lack of a constitutional basis, peace-
keeping was plagued for many years by a degree of uncertainty
regarding the legitimate source of authority for peacekeeping
authorization and control. The Soviet Union and its allies, for
example, believed that any United Nations action involving the use of
force should rest solely within the scope of the Security Council's
responsibilities.96 Similarly, the Soviets contended that any assis-
tance to the Security Council should come from the Military Staff
Committee. 7 The majority of member states, including the United
States, maintained a different position: as long as peacekeeping
operations were conducted as consent operations outside the scope of
Chapter VII's enforcement provisions, it was permissible, and even
necessary, that the Secretary General exercise control over peace-
keeping operations.9
The conceptual impasse over the control of peacekeeping
operations was eventually resolved by Secretary General Kurt
Waldheim in October 1973, at which time the Security Council
established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).99 In
his report on the new operation, Waldheim proposed that the Security
Council have ultimate control over peacekeeping missions. Security
Council authority would include the right to authorize an operation
and approve any fundamental changes in its mandate.1" Day-to-day
94. See RIKHYE, supra note 93, at 23-24; see also Anthony C. Arend, The United Nations
and the New World Order, 81 GEO. LJ. 491, 506 (1993).
95. See UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETS:
A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 5-6 (2d ed. 1990).
96. James O.C. Jonah, The Management of UN Peacekeeping, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND PEACEKEEPING 75, 76 (Indar Jit Rikhye & Kjell Skjelsbaek eds., 1991).
97. RUSSELL, supra note 24, at 472.
98. Jonah, supra note 96, at 76.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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supervision of the mission, however, would be exercised by the
Secretary General, who would consult closely with the Security
Council during the course of the operation.' All operations that
have taken place since UNEF II have followed this pattern, and it is
now well established that the ultimate authority for peacekeeping
operations resides in the Security Council while day-to-day supervi-
sion is vested in the Secretary General."°
2. "Strategic Direction." The United Nations has scrupulously
avoided using Chapter VII terminology regarding enforcement when
discussing peacekeeping. Thus, even though the term "strategic
direction" is rarely used in the peacekeeping context, there is still a
need to translate the political goals of a particular operation into
military objectives. In peacekeeping operations, this function has
been performed by the Secretary General's Military Advisor. 3
a. The Military Advisor. The position of Military Advisor was
created by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in late 1960 to assist
in the management of peacekeeping operations. 4 The Military
Advisor generally functions as an assistant to the Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping Operations." In this capacity, the
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 95, at
6-7 (describing the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary
General regarding military operations and personnel).
103. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. DURCII & BARRY M. BLECHMAN, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE
UNITED NATIONS IN THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER 68 (1992) (highlighting the history of the
post of Military Advisor to the Secretary General).
104. Jonah, supra note 96, at 84.
105. In February 1992 the Secretary General announced a major reorganization of the
United Nations Secretariat. The reorganized Secretariat contains seven departments which
report directly to the Secretary General. Three of the departments are responsible for the
majority of the United Nations programs. The Political Affairs department is run by two Under
Secretaries General; they manage the Office of General Assembly Affairs, the Office of Security
Council Affairs, Peacemaking and Mediation, Research and Analysis, and Disarmament Affairs.
The Economic Development department concentrates on economic matters, and the Department
of Administration and Management oversees the Office of Conference Services and the Field
Operations Division.
Four other departments with more specific functions, including the Office for Peacekeeping
Operations, also report directly to the Secretary General. These departments include:
Peacekeeping Operations (where the Military Advisor performs his or her duties), the
Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Office of Legal Affairs, and the Department of Public
Information. Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/1 (1993); see also UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNOUNCES CHANGES IN SECRETARIAT,
U.N. Doc. SG/A/479 (1992).
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Military Advisor's primary function is to ensure that the civilian
leadership in the Secretariat receives sound military advice and that
the requisite administrative and logistic arrangements for peacekeep-
ing operations are coordinated with the Director of Field Operations
Division.0 6
The recent demand for peacekeeping has put unprecedented
strain on the Military Advisor's capacity to stay abreast of events.
The current Military Advisor, Canadian Brigadier General Maurice
Baril, joined the Secretariat in July 1992, and has seen the number of
deployed peacekeeping personnel grow to approximately 60,000.°7
Between July 1992 and January 1993, Baril's headquarters staff grew
from six to thirty, with dozens of additional personnel assigned from
member states to work on specific missions."°
b. The Secretary General's relationship with troop contributing
states. Because the United Nations first significant peacekeeping
operation, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), was not
authorized by the Security Council but by the General Assembly,"°9
the Secretary General requested a smaller body to which he could
turn for counsel as UNEF progressed."0 The General Assembly
complied by creating an "Advisory Committee" for the purpose of
undertaking "the development of those aspects of the planning for the
Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General
Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct
responsibility of the [force commander]."" Hammarskjold was
made chairman of the committee."
2
Hammarskjold valued the UNEF Advisory Committee's counsel,
particularly in political matters.13 Thus, when the United Nations
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was established four years later,
106. Jonah, supra note 96, at 84-85.
107. Alan Ferguson, The Canadian Who Leads the First Global Army, TORONTO STAR, Jan.
26, 1993, at A17; Gellman, supra note 7, at Al.
108. Ferguson, supra note 107, at A17.
109. G.A. Res. 1000, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., 565th plen. mtg. at 2-3, U.N.
Doc. ES-I (1956).
110. ROBERT C.R. SIEKMANN, NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING FORCES 99 (1991).
111. G.A. Res. 1001, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., 567th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. ES-I (1956):
112. SiEKMANN, supra note 110, at 99.
113. [1 Middle East] ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 273 (1969).
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Hammarskjold sought the formation of another advisory commit-
tee. 4 This time, however, the Security Council-which, after
UNEF, had reclaimed political control over peacekeeping opera-
tions-ignored Hammarskjold's request. He proceeded to establish
an ONUC Advisory Committee on his own authority."5 The
ONUC Advisory Committee was composed exclusively of representa-
tives from troop contributing states, unlike its UNEF counterpart in
which troop contribution had not been a prerequisite for member-
ship." 6 Despite the fact that the ONUC Advisory Committee again
provided a valuable forum for the exchange of views,"7 ONUC was
one of the last operations in which consultation with troop contribut-
ing countries was formalized."8
3. Command and Composition of Forces. A peacekeeping
operation is commanded by a force commander who is selected by the
Secretary General, subject to approval by the Security Council; the
force commander has full authority to assign all members of his or her
staff."9 "Command," however, holds a somewhat different meaning
in the peacekeeping context than it does in a conventional military
operation.
The typical United Nations peacekeeping operation utilizes a
dual command system in which the force commander or Chief
Military Observer reports to the Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations." ° Typically, the force commander will
exercise his or her command authority through a military chief of
staff, who reports directly to the force commander.'' In addition,
however, a civilian Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) will also
report directly to the force commander and to the Field Operations
Division in New York.'" The CAO supervises a staff of civilians
and is responsible for executing budget and logistic matters pursuant
to United Nations financial regulations. While this bifurcated chain
of command has, on occasion, made the force commander's job more
114. SiEKMANN, supra note 110, at 101-02.
115. See id. at 102.
116. Id.
117. [3 Africa] ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 64 (1980).
118. SiEKMANN, supra note 110, at 104.
119. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 406.
120. DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 75.
121. Jonah, supra note 96, at 85.
122. Id. at 85-87.
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complicated,"z it is arguably justified on the grounds that military
commanders are seldom familiar with United Nations financial proce-
dures.124
Despite the limits imposed on the force commander's authority
by the CAO, the force commander exercises a significant degree of
authority given the fact that the force is usually an amalgam of
national contingents. The force commander has full authority with
respect to all deployment and movement of national contingents and
general responsibility for the good order and discipline of the
operation." In addition, the force commander is normally empow-
ered to "make investigations, conduct inquiries and require informa-
tion, reports and consultations for the purpose of discharging this
responsibility."' 26 While there may be close coordination between
the force commander and the heads of national contingents regarding
disciplinary matters, ultimate responsibility for the administration of
discipline rests with the heads of the respective national contin-
gents.127
As peacekeeping operations expand in scope and complexity,
both force commanders and CAOs will increasingly find themselves
reporting to a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary General
in the field. Because missions such as civilian police supervision,
election observation, and civil administration are functions outside the
traditional scope of a military officer's training, the Special Represen-
tative allows the Secretary General to maintain a political representa-
tive on scene to deal with the increasingly complex political demands
of peacekeeping operations."
4. The Peacekeeping Model The nature of the peacekeeping
mission has had considerable influence on the command, control, and
composition of peacekeeping forces. Because the mission requires
that peacekeeping forces serve as a buffer between disputants, a
premium is placed on ensuring that the buffer is neutral, both in fact
and appearance. 29 The requirement for neutrality, in turn, has led
123. RIKHYE, supra note 93, at 215.
124. See DURcH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 75.
125. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMAION, supra note 95, at 406-07.
126. Id. at 407; see also BOwET, supra note 34, at 340-43 (describing the delineation of
authority between the Secretary General and the force commander).
127. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 407.
128. See DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 75-76.
129. See, eg., Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical
Analysis and Future Directions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, supra note 96,
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to a preference for the nonuse of force. A "peace-keeping force
which descends into the conflict may well become part of the problem
instead of the solution to it.' ' 30
Without relying on arms, peacekeepers have come to rely heavily
on the moral authority inherent in their status as representatives of
the international community. 3 ' Thus, to enhance the perception of
internationalism, peacekeeping forces have traditionally been
composed of a wide variety of troops from small or nonaligned states,
with permanent members of the Security Council and other major
powers making troop contributions only under exceptional circum-
stances.132
The peacekeeping mission has thus produced a model for
command and control much different from the single-state and
managed-coalition models that have evolved out of large-scale
enforcement actions. The neutrality requirement has precluded
single-state domination of peacekeeping and has resulted both in
more genuinely multinational forces as well as more multinational
command structures over the forces. The peacekeeping model also
differs from the Chapter VII model. While the Security Council
continues to authorize peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat has
provided a large measure of political control and strategic direction
equivalent.
Although the multinational character of peacekeeping command
and control has no doubt been the source of much of peacekeeping's
success, it is, when combined with the exclusion of the major powers
from peacekeeping management and participation, at least a partial
source of peacekeeping's limitations. Unless a diverse multina-
tional force trains toward the goal of establishing tactical operations
between the groups, it will be capable of little more than passive
monitoring."3  Thus, it would seem that traditional peacekeeping
at 32, 41-45.
130. Brian Urquhart, Beyond the 'Sheriffs Posse,' 32 SURVIVAL 196, 201 (1990).
131. See Kjel Skjelsbaek, U.N. Peacekeeping: Expectations, Limitations and Results: Forty
Years of Mixed Experience, in T1E UNrrED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, supra note 96, at 52,
62.
132. Id. at 65.
133. See Johan Jorgen Hoist, Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations, 32 SURvVAL 264, 268
(1990) ("The multinational composition of the force encompassing a diversity of professional and
cultural traditions and attitudes makes it very hard to achieve uniform behaviour.").
134. See generally John MacKinlay & Jarat Chopra, Second Generation Multinational
Operations, WASH. Q., Summer 1992, at 113. "Any laxity in a second generation operation will
be extremely dangerous. If, for example, national interpretations of the use of force are allowed
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forces will be capable of performing only limited missions unless the
national contingents comprising the forces train together in methods
generally unfamiliar to traditional peacekeepers.
IV. AD HOC RESPONSES TO A NEW MISSION: "PEACE
ENFORCEMENT" IN SOMALIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
A. The Beginning of "Peace Enforcement"
Throughout the United Nations's first forty-five years, peacekeep-
ing and enforcement missions were conducted in rigid isolation from
one another. With the exception of ONUC, when United Nations
forces used force to help defeat the attempted secession in the
Katanga province of the Congo, 35 United Nations peacekeepers
have been able to accomplish their limited objectives without reliance
on an enforcement capability. Cold war politics generally ensured
that peacekeepers operated in situations where it was unlikely they
would encounter significant armed resistance to their mission;
peacekeepers were, after all, deployed only with the consent of the
parties.'36 The fall of Soviet communism changed this dynamic. By
creating the possibility for cooperation in the Security Council and
increasing the international community's willingness to confront
conflicts that would have been off-limits under the old order, the
revolution in Russia set the stage for a revolution in the United
Nations as well.
In January 1992 the Security Council heads of state met in New
York for the first ever Security Council summit meeting.'37 Sensing
a historic opportunity for cooperation, the Security Council called on
the new Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to report on ways
in which the United Nations's capacity for maintaining world peace
to assert themselves in a multinational force, an overreaction by inexperienced troops may set
back the development of a new option by several decades." Id. at 122-23.
135. See Stanley Meisler, Crisis in Katanga, MHQ: THE QJ. OF MILITARY HIST., Winter
1993, at 70,70 (describing circumstances in the Congo that led to the authorization for United
Nations peacekeepers to use force); cf. Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Note, Secession: State
Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 302-07 (noting that that United Nations does not recognize a right to
secession).
136. When the United Nations faced a confrontation with Egypt over Egypt's withdrawal of
consent for UNEF in 1967, peacekeepers were withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula. See
HMGGINS, supra note 113, at 480-81.
137. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (1992); see also Paul
Lewis, Leaders Want to Enhance U.N.'s Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at A8.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
could be strengthened. On June 17, 1992, Boutros-Ghali responded
with An Agenda for Peace,38 a report that explored the entire range
of United Nations peace and security responsibilities. A significant
portion of An Agenda for Peace is devoted to a discussion of the role
of military force in future United Nations undertakings. Boutros-
Ghali focused first on the Charter framework for maintaining peace
and security, and called for the Security Council, with the assistance
of the Military Staff Committee, to open negotiations for the
conclusion of special agreements under Article 43.139 Boutros-Ghali
envisioned Article 43 forces serving as a limited deterrent while
assuming that such forces would never be sufficiently large or
equipped to deal with a threat from a major force.'" Boutros-Ghali
also reviewed the state of traditional peacekeeping, citing the
increasing demand for peacekeeping services and the financial strain
peacekeeping places on the United Nations.'4'
While the Secretary General's discussion generally reflected the
traditional dichotomy between enforcement and peacekeeping, the
most interesting aspect of the report was his identification of missions
that would not be considered traditional peacekeeping or enforce-
ment, such as allowing United Nations troops to use force to restore
and maintain a cease-fire. As he noted, "[t]his task can on occasion
exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of
peace-keeping force contributors."'42 To respond to such situations,
he called for the creation of "peace enforcement" units, consisting of
volunteers from member states.143 These units would be more
heavily armed than traditional peacekeepers and would be deployed
with authorization of the Security Council and serve under the
"command" of the Secretary General.' 44
Regardless of the merits of his proposal for "peace enforcement"
units, there is little doubt that Boutros-Ghali correctly identified an
emerging challenge. As subsequently discussed by John MacKinlay
and Jarat Chopra:
138. An Agenda for Peace; Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992) [hereinafter An
Agenda for Peace].
139. Id. paras. 42-43.
140. Id. para. 43.
141. Id. paras. 46-54.
142. Id. para. 44.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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In reality a second generation of U.N. military operations is already
emerging, outside the parameters of traditional peacekeeping, to
cope with the new commitments of a more effective Security
Council. The enlarging span of legitimate military tasks can be
depicted as a continuum: at one end are the lowest intensity opera-
tions, involving the smallest number of assets and the least risk of
conflict to U.N. contingents; at the opposing end conflict level is
high and involves commensurately larger military assets.... [T]he
operational focus is already moving toward the center of the
continuum, into the areas of maintaining law and order.., and the
protection of humanitarian assistance and refugees.14
Indeed, even as An Agenda For Peace was submitted to the
Security Council, the United Nations was involved in at least two
operations that required more than traditional peacekeeping. In both
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations was quickly
confronting a difficult reality: successful intervention in this new
generation of conflicts requires both the capability and the desire to
project force-a capability and desire that United Nations peacekeep-
ing operations have traditionally lacked.
B. The United States and United Nations Partnership in "Peace
Enforcement"
There have been two major peacekeeping efforts between the
United States and the United Nations, the first in Somalia and the
second shortly thereafter in the former Yugoslavia.
1. The Intervention in Somalia. The United Nations established
three different missions in Somalia: the United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM), the United Nations Interim Task Force
145. MacKinlay & Chopra, supra note 134, at 116-18. MacKinlay and Chopra have outlined
what they perceive as the conflict continuum by listing each of the various stages in a conflict
scenario. The various steps include "Conventional Observer Missions," "Traditional Peacekeep.
ing," "Preventative Peacekeeping," "Supervising a Cease-fire Between Irregular Forces,"
"Assisting in the Maintenance of Law and Order," "Protecting the Delivery of Humanitarian
Assistance," "The Guarantee of Rights of Passage," "Sanctions," and "Enforcement." Id. at 117;
see also Thomas G. Weiss, New Challenges for U.N. Military Operations: Implementing an
Agenda for Peace, WASHr. Q., Winter 1993, at 51.
These new kinds of operations are qualitatively and quantitatively different from their
predecessors: the consent of the parties cannot be assumed, and the levels of military
effectiveness that may be required from U.N. forces go far beyond the parameters of
a traditionally lightly armed and ad hoc peacekeeping force, as do the dangers.
Id. at 54; see also Brian Urquhart, Who Can Stop Civil Wars?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, §4,
at 9.
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(UNITAF), and UNOSOM II, which was a modified version of
UNOSOM.
a. Creation of UNOSOM and UNITAE In November 1991
heavy fighting broke out in Somalia's capital city of Mogadishu
between supporters of Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and
supporters of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, Commander of the
United Somali Congress (USC).' In addition, other heavily armed
elements gained control of various parts of Mogadishu, including the
port and airport. Some of these groups declared their alliance with
one of the two main factions while others remained independent. 47
The resultant fighting created widespread death and destruction,
forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to leave the city."4
The United Nations responded in early 1992 by sending United
Nations Under Secretary James O.C. Jonah to Mogadishu for talks
aimed at bringing a halt to the fighting and initiating relief efforts for
civilians. This process led to a cease-fire between Mohamed and
Aidid.4 9 In April the Security Council established cease-fire
monitoring operations and authorized the establishment of a fifty-
person unarmed military observation unit in Mogadishu.s In
addition, the UNOSOM security force was authorized to provide
security for both United Nations personnel in Somalia and United
Nations relief supplies delivered to Mogadishu.' UNOSOM was
comprised of Pakistani forces and eventually reached a peak strength
of 715 soldiers, consisting of the fifty military observers, an infantry
battalion, logistics personnel, and a small headquarters company and
staff.
152
As time progressed, it became obvious that UNOSOM was
overwhelmed. In a report to the Security Council on November 24,
146. Clashes Go On in Somali Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at A8.
147. Fact Sheet" Somalia-Operation Restore Hope, in 3 U.S. DEP'T STATE DISPATCH, 898,
902 (1992) [hereinafter Fact Sheet" Somalia].
148. Id. at 899.
149. See Paul Lewis, Warring Somali Factions Reach a Truce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at
5.
150. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at para. 3, U.N. Doc. SIRESI751
(1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 751]; The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at paras. 24-26, U.N. Doc. S/23829 (1992); Paul Lewis, Reined In by
U.S., U.N. Limits Mission to Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at 15.
151. S.C. Res. 751, supra note 150, para. 14.
152. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and
19 of Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (1993)
[hereinafter Report of 3 March].
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1992, Boutros-Ghali noted that the government of Somalia had
completely disintegrated,53 that the Various armed factions were
refusing to cooperate with UNOSOM,' and that international relief
workers and United Nations personnel were coming under increasing
attack.5  Meanwhile, thousands were starving to death."6  With
classic diplomatic understatement, Boutros-Ghali declared that "the
situation is not improving."'5 7
On November 29, 1992, Boutros-Ghali presented the Security
Council with five options in Somalia.'58  The first two op-
tions-proceeding with the status quo or withdrawing complete-
ly-were dismissed as unworkable. Boutros-Ghali determined that
the third option, creating a "major show of force" by UNOSOM in
Mogadishu, would give rise to too many difficult questions.'59
Instead, Boutros-Ghali focused on a choice between a "country-wide
enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations
command and control,"'" and an identical operation "undertaken
by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security
Council." '' Boutros-Ghali favored the former option,62 though he
realized it would be impractical under the circumstances.' 63
The idea for a countrywide enforcement operation by a group of
member states had originated with the United States." The Bush
Administration had begun giving serious consideration to several
policy options in mid-November, and by November 25, 1992, the
President settled on a plan to use United States ground forces to
153. See Letter Dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. St24859 (1992)
[hereinafter Report of 24 November].
154. See id. at 1.
155. Id. at 2, 3.
156. Fact SheeL Somalia, supra note 147 (reporting that as many as 3,000 Somalis were dying
weekly and that as many as 300,000 Somalis had died prior to December 1992).
157. Report of 24 November, supra note 153, at 4.
158. Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992) [hereinafter
Report of 29 November].
159. Id. at 2-4.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Id. at 6 (stating that "[i]f forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United
Nations command and control").
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 5.
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alleviate the humanitarian crisis.165 Because General Colin Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military officials had
been insistent that the United States maintain command and control
of its forces, the President directed acting Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleberger to convey to the Secretary General an offer of United
States intervention, on the strict condition that the United States
command the operation. The United States initially wanted a
public request from the Security Council that the United States
command the operation, that the United States appoint the command-
er,167 and that UNOSOM be placed under United States com-
mand,'16 but it eventually backed off from these requests.'69
In his letter of November 29, 1992, to the Security Council, the
Secretary General made clear that he would not accept the United
States offer without certain modifications.
If the members of the Security Council were to favour [an enforce-
ment action undertaken by Member States], my advice would be
that the Council should seek to agree with the Member States who
would undertake the operation on ways of recognizing the fact that
it had been authorized by the Security Council and that the
Security Council therefore had a legitimate interest in the manner
in which it was carried out.'7
To ensure this objective, the Secretary General recommended that the
authorizing resolution for such an operation emphasize that the
military operation was authorized in support of the "wider mandate
entrusted to the Secretary General to provide humanitarian relief,"
and that the military operation would last for a specific time period,
ultimately to be replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping operation
as soon as was feasible.' Boutros-Ghali also recommended that if
military action is to be taken it should be under the command and
control of the United Nations. In addition, the Security Council
should appoint an ad hoe commission to oversee the entire opera-
tion. 72
165. Michael R. Gordon, Somali Aid Plan Is Called Most Ambitious Option, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1992, at 6.
166. See id.
167. Paul Lewis, Key U.N. Members Agree to United States Force in Somalia Mission, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1992, at Al, A14.
168. John M. Goshko, United Nations Orders United States-Led Force into Somalia, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al, A20.
169. Goshko, supra note 168, at A20; Lewis, supra note 167, at A14.
170. Report of 29 November, supra note 158, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5-6.
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The Security Council responded with what was essentially a
compromise. .Security Council Resolution 794 implicitly accepted the
United States offer to command the operation-to be known as
UNITAF-by stating that the Security Council "[w]elcome[d] the
offer by a Member State" to establish an operation necessary to
provide a secure environment. 73 In addition, the Security Council
provided the United States with an expansive mandate authorizing
"all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the
delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia.74 While satisfying the
United States's fundamental concern that it remain in command of
the operation, Resolution 794 also contained provisions of importance
to the Secretary General. First, it authorized the Secretary General
to participate in the necessary arrangements for "unified command
and control of the forces."'175 In addition, the Security Council
appointed an ad hoc commission (recommended earlier by the
Secretary General) to oversee the operation, and declined to place the
already deployed UNOSOM force under United States command,
opting instead to create a liaison between UNOSOM and the unified
command. 76 Most importantly, the Security Council reserved the
right to phase out the UNITAF stage of the operation in favor of a
more traditional peacekeeping operation.'"
b. The importance of UNITAE The Security Council's action
in Somalia represents an important departure from previous command
and control models in several respects. First, although United States
dominance of the UNITAF command structure closely resembled the
single-state approach employed in Korea, and, to a lesser extent, the
managed-coalition model employed in the Persian Gulf, Resolution
794 also provided the Security Council and Secretary General with
limited, but important, control over the operation.'78 The authentic-
ity of this control was evident in the tension that developed between
the United States and the United Nations over the timing of the
transition to the second phase of the operation, UNOSOM II.
Throughout the UNITAF phase, neither the United States nor the
173. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. para. 8, U.N. Doc. S1RES/794 (1992).
174. Id. para. 10.
175. Id para. 12.
176. Id. paras. 14-15.
177. Id. para. 18.
178. The Secretary General's and Security Council's increased political control over the
operation was a significant theme in the Security Council deliberations preceding adoption of
Resolution 794. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145 mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3145 (1992).
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Secretary General hesitated to voice annoyance over the other's
progress in accomplishing' the transition.'79 The United States
repeatedly insisted that the United Nations was too slow in assuming
responsibility for the operation; the Secretary General insisted that
the United States needed to do more to disarm violent segments of
the population before the United Nations could assume control.'80
It seems highly unlikely that this sort of public discussion would have
occurred during the Korean or Persian Gulf conflicts.
c. The creation and importance of UNOSOM II. On May 4,
1993, UNITAF was relieved of command in Somalia by UNOSOM
11".1 The Security Council had approved this transition on March
26, 1993, authorizing a UNOSOM II force of 28,000 personnel."8
In many respects, UNOSOM II resembled a traditional peacekeeping
operation. Troops from a wide variety of countries participated under
the command of Turkish General Cevic Bir'"' in a mission which
included ensuring that "all factions continue to respect the cessation
of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed."'"
In addition, the entire operation was to be conducted under the close
supervision of the Secretary General and the Security Council."8
However, like UNITAF, UNOSOM II also broke important
ground. For the first time since ONUC and the Katangan secession,
forces assigned to an operation with the essential characteristics of a
peacekeeping operation were also authorized to use force. In
addition, UNOSOM II marked the first time that any significant
number of United States forces have ever been placed under the
command of an international organization.186
While the significance of the latter development should not be
minimized, it is important to note the many conditions placed on the
179. See, e.g., John Lancaster, United States Beginning Pullout From Somalia; Slow
Withdrawal Aimed Partly at Forcing United Nations to Take Responsibility, WASH. POST, Jan.
19, 1993, at Al, A17; Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Chief Spells Out Dispute with U.S. on Somalia,
Reuters Library Report, Dec. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
180. See Lancaster, supra note 179, at Al, A17; Leopold, supra note 179.
181. Keith B. Richburg, United Nations Takes Command of Troops in Somalia, WASH. POST,
May 5, 1993, at A23.
182. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 1, 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814(1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 814]; Report of 3 March, supra note 152, paras. 71, 74.
183. Eric Schmitt, Most U.S. Troops Will Leave Somalia by April in United Nations Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al, A4.
184. Report of 3 March, supra note 152, para. 57.
185. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 182, para. 18.
186. See Richburg, supra note 181, at A30.
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arrangement by the United States. First, United Nations orders
affecting United States forces were transmitted from the United
Nations commander to United States forces through the UNOSOM
II Deputy Commander, United States Army Major General Thomas
Montgomery."w General Montgomery, however, also served as the
Commander of United States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM), and in
this capacity excercised command over United States forces in
Somalia and reported directly to the Commander in Chief, United
States Central Command (USCINCCENT)."' USCINCCENT
retained command of USFORSOM and "delegate[d] operational,
tactical, and/or administrative control of USFORSOM as required to
support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.' ' 89  In
essence, the United States retained command of the United States
forces but delegated certain attributes of the command to the United
Nations.
In addition, United States forces under the United Nations
command consisted only of logistics forces unlikely to encounter
direct combat under the orders of the United Nations command-
er."l The United States units that carried out strikes against Aidid
were not under United Nations command, but instead were part of a
"tactical quick reaction force" commanded by the United States."'
Furthermore, while the United Nations commander was Turkish,
Turkey is a NATO member, and General Bir's selection was also
reportedly blessed by General Powell." In addition to having
significant influence in the choice of General Bir, the United States
provided the Secretary General's Special Representative, to whom
187. See Defense Department Regular Briefing, supra note 1.
188. See UNITED STATES DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY,
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES: SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS OPERATION
IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM II) (June 8,1993) (on file with author); see also Commander in Chief,
United States Central Command, Terms of Reference for U.S. Forces Somalia, United Nations
Operation in Somalia Force Command, Apr. 28, 1993 (on file with author).
189. UNITED STATES DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 188.
190. See John Goshko & Trevor Rowe, U.S. Would Let Some GIs Serve Under U.N. Flag,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1993, at A16; Schmitt, supra note 183, at Al.
191. See Report of 3 March, supra note 152, para. 71; Gellman, supra note 7, at Al.
192. Stuart Auerbach, Somali Attacks Seen as Intensifying: Firefights Mar Turkish General's
Arrival Delay U.S. Handover in South, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1993, at A12.
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General Bir reported,"9 retired United States Navy Admiral
Jonathan Howe.194
d. The hybrid model While UNITAF and UNOSOM II are
significant in their own fights, perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the intervention in Somalia is the fact that it is the first United
Nations operation intended from the outset to join what are essential-
ly single-state and peacekeeping models in the same operation. Faced
with the first significant "peace enforcement" mission of the post-cold
war era, the United Nations and United States have attempted to
build an operation capable of moving along the continuum of conflict
from a scenario requiring enforcement capabilities to one approximat-
ing traditional peacekeeping." Of equal importance, by authorizing
the use of force and maintaining a United States offshore presence,
the United Nations preserved its ability to return to the enforcement
end of the continuum in the event violence erupted again, as it
eventually did.'96
The ultimate success of the United Nations intervention in
Somalia may not be known for some time. Even if the United States
and United Nations partnership in Somalia proves successful,
however, an additional question remains: how useful is the hybrid
model as a prototype for United Nations interventions? The answer
is not obvious. One can imagine a scenario in which an initial single-
state deployment-similar to that relied on during UNITAF-might
be unavailable for any number of political or military reasons.
Without a volunteer to assume the role of single-state leader, the
United Nations will find the hybrid model unavailable. Likewise,
even if a state is willing to participate in the initial stages of an
intervention, it may be unwilling to participate on a sustained basis,
fearing a disproportionate (and therefore unacceptable) investment of
lives, resources, and capital. Given current United Nations capabili-
ties, the timing of the single state's disengagement is critical: if done
too early, the follow-up peacekeeping forces may be overwhelmed by
residual resistance, resulting either in the intervention's failure or a
requirement for renewed single-state participation.
193. Report of 3 March, supra note 152, para. 97.
194. Retired U.S. Admiral to be Transition Envoy, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1993, at A29.
195. MacKinlay & Chopra, supra note 134, at 116-18 (describing the conflict continuum from
peacekeeping to enforcement).
196. See also Report of3 March, supra note 152, para. 74 (reserving to the Secretary General
the right to deploy additional troops),
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2. Command and Control in the Former Yugoslavia. The ethnic
conflict in the former Yugoslavia rivals Somalia as the United
Nations's most intractable problem. While there are no doubt many
lessons yet to be learned about the role of the United Nations in the
crisis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR)'" has proven incapable of main-
taining order.9 ' As diplomatic events continue to unfold, it is
unclear to what extent a more significant military presence may yet
be required, but it seems that whatever the outcome, UNPROFOR,
as presently constituted, will become increasingly irrelevant.
UNPROFOR's inability to maintain order in Yugoslavia parallels
UNOSOM's inadequacy in Somalia, and a solution to the dilemma in
Yugoslavia has proven equally difficult. The hybrid model of military
intervention first relied on in Somalia has been unavailable to the
United Nations in Yugoslavia because the United Nations has been
unable to find a state willing to assume the role of single-state leader.
With no credible military alternative, the United Nations has had no
choice but to concede the first phase of the conflict and to stand aside
in the face of shocking aggression.
If the warring factions eventually agree to a settlement, the
conflict will likely enter a new phase requiring precisely the type of
cease-fire "peace enforcement" the Secretary General envisioned in
An Agenda for Peace.' If this comes to pass, the United Nations
will need what it does not have: an enforcement-capable, truly
multinational force able to accomplish a difficult mission without
197. UNPROFOR was established on Feb. 21,1992. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3055th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES743 (1992). UNPROFOR is built around a traditional
United Nations command and control relationship with the usual rules of engagement. See
Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., paras. 11, 13, 20-26, U.N. Doc. No. S/23592 (1992).
198. See e.g., Weiss, supra note 145, at 56.
The U.N.'s initial involvement in Croatia, with close to 14,000 peacekeepers, did not
serve to prevent the ethnic cleansing, detention camps, refugees, and killing in
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Europeans and the Western Alliance were
unable to get the parties to halt their internecine fighting... . The 1,500 U.N. soldiers
initially assigned to the Sarajevo area quickly proved inadequate; and in early
September 1992 the Security Council authorized adding at least 5,000 more troops for
the purpose of protecting humanitarian convoys and escorting detainees in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Id.; see also Warren Strobel, Ex-envoy sees Somalia-style Effort in Bosnia, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
15,1993, at A10 (quoting Robert Oakley, former United States special envoy to Somalia) ("The
Serbs have stayed one step ahead of [UNPROFOR]. They've never been intimidated.
[UNPROFOR] got behind at the beginning and they stayed behind.").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
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exposing any state to disproportionate risk. The United Nations's
only hope in Yugoslavia is that NATO might provide such a force.
a. NATO's current and future roles. Having never fired a shot
in anger during the cold war, NATO's initial role in the former
Yugoslavia was to assume responsibility for enforcing the Security
Council's "no-fly" zone over Bosnia.' NATO aircraft patrolled
designated sectors to ensure that Serbian aircraft were unable to use
the skies for reinforcing their ground offensive."' While the
military significance of the no-fly zone is debatable,2 2 the political
implications were potentially significant: by enforcing the no-fly zone
and conducting maritime interception operations in the Adriatic,
NATO demonstrated for the first time in its history a willingness to
operate beyond the borders of its member states in furtherance of a
United Nations objective.
How much NATO will be willing to do beyond its relatively low-
risk commitment to enforcing the no-fly zone remains unclear. Initial
enthusiasm within NATO for providing a "peace enforcement" force
to guarantee the terms of a peace settlement waned quickly. 3
Speculation that Bosnia might serve as a laboratory for the develop-
ment of a new NATO peacekeeping/peace enforcement capability
gave way to concern on the part of member governments about
prolonged commitments and "quagmire[s]. 2 °4 As a result, NATO
officials have experienced considerable difficulty gaining national
commitments for the forces necessary to police a prospective settlement.
200. See, eg., William Drozdiak, NATO to Patrol Bosnian Skies Starting Monday, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1993, at Al; see also S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg. para. 4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing member states to act "nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements" to enforce the no-fly zone "under the authority of the Security
Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary General and UNPROFOR").
201. See Americans Uneasy About Any Yugoslav Involvement, Reuter Library Report, Apr.
10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; see also Italian General Rossetti to Head
No-Fly Ban, Reuter Library Report, Apr. 3,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
202. See Paul Lewis, U.S. Seeks Tougher Sanctions on Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,1993,
at A15.
203. See Michael R. Gordon, Limited U.S. Forces Held Still an Option in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1993, at A7.
204. See Nicholas Doughty, Doubts Grow Over NATO Plans for Bosnia Peace Agreement,
Reuter European Community Report, Mar. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File (noting the reluctance of NATO members to intervene in Yugoslavia because the situation
is a potential "quagmire"); see also Gordon, supra note 203, at A7 (describing the Clinton
Administration's vain efforts to muster sufficient support within the NATO alliance for
assembling the peacekeeping force for Bosnia even when it appeared possible the Serbs might
sign the Vance-Owen accord).
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The prolonged negotiations associated with planning a NATO
peace enforcement deployment illuminated both the appeal and
difficulty of relying on NATO as the nucleus of an ad hoc "peace
enforcement" force. In Yugoslavia, for example, NATO could
provide an enforcement capability to support a United Nations
brokered peace accord. 5 For the United States, NATO would
provide a multinational vehicle for a mission that would be extremely
difficult to perform unilaterally,' while NATO participation would
allow the United States considerable control: United States Army
General George A. Joulwan is NATO's Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), 7 and United States Navy Admiral Jeremy M.
(Mike) Boorda is NATO's Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), with responsibilities including the
former Yugoslavia." In addition, United States forces have
operated within NATO for decades and are comfortable with NATO
organization and procedure.
While both the United States and United Nations could thus find
NATO a useful vehicle through which to pursue their respective
interests, the command and control details for a prospective NATO
force have provoked considerable debate. A NATO force would
likely operate under United Nations authorization, but the difficult
issues of political control, strategic direction, and operational
command remain unsettled. The Secretary General has long insisted
that a NATO operation be under United Nations "strategic and
political control,"2' a position that was vigorously supported by
205. Recent reports indicate that NATO officials anticipate that "peace enforcement" in the
former Yugoslavia will require 50,000 troops, including approximately 25,000 United States
forces. Charles Aldinger, U.S., NATO Move Cautiously on Peacekeepers, Reuters, Sept. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
206. See, eg., Henry A. Kissinger, The Risks of a U.S. Enforcement Role in Bosnia: Reliving
Vietnam or Beirut, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at M2; see also Informal Notes for Testimony to
the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Federal News Service, Feb. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File ("There is little predisposition in the
United States for a major and potentially bloody full-scale military intervention-and in Europe,
without which an American intervention would not be politically viable-even less so.");
Americans Uneasy About Any Yugoslav Involvement, Reuter Library Report, Apr. 10, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
207. Sue Pleming, NATO's New European Commander Takes Over, Reuters, Oct. 22,1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
208. John Lancaster, Bosnia Peace Mission Could Involve 64,000 NATO Troops, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28, 1993, at A25.
209. Julia Preston, Boutros-Ghali Asserts U. N. Role in Bosnia, WASH. POST, May 5, 1993,
at A24. But cf. Paul Lewis, U.N. Leader Backs Takeover of Force in Bosnia by NATO, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A10 (reporting that Boutros-Ghali "would welcome NATO's taking
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France.21° While the United States had consistently favored NATO
control over all operations,2 it made a significant concession in
August 1993 by agreeing to a United Nations veto over airstrikes
against Serb positions.2 More recently, President Clinton has
stated that he will insist on NATO command over any Bosnian
peacekeeping force.
2 13
Thus, while details regarding the command and control of a
potential peacekeeping force remain unclear as of publication of this
Article, Under Secretary General Kofi Annan speculated publicly in
March 1993 that NATO's CINCSOUTH would be asked to command
United Nations operations throughout all the former Yugoslavia
except Bosnia and Herzegovina, where UNPROFOR would remain
in command.214 Under this plan, both commands would report to
the Security Council through the Secretary General.215
b. The NATO model. Given the demise of its cold war mission
and the lack of any credible multinational enforcement capability,
many have suggested that NATO make itself available on a regional
basis to prevent "future Bosnias."2 "6  This idea retains a certain
appeal, despite the tremendous effort required to obtain a NATO
full control" in Bosnia, but not clarifying precisely what full control would mean).
210. See Nicholas Doughty, NATO Approves Secret Plans for Bosnia Peace Force, Reuter
European Community Report, Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
211. Id.
212. Rick Atkinson & Barton Gellman, NATO Endorses Plan for Bosnia, WASH. POST, Aug.
10, 1993, at A10 (describing NATO agreement not to undertake air strikes without the prior
approval of the Secretary General); Barton Gellman & Trevor Rowe, U.S. Agrees to U.N. Veto
on Bombing, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1993, at Al (describing the memorandum of understanding
signed between Admiral Boorda and UNPROFOR Commander Lieutenant General Jean Cot
giving Cot the authority to veto targets selected by NATO).
213. Friedman, supra note 11, at Al.
214. Lewis, supra note 3, at A10; Preston, supra note 209, at A24.
215. Lewis, supra note 3, at A10.
216. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, NATO and United States Foreign Policy, 4
DISPATcH 119, 120 (Dept. of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 1993) (excerpts from remarks to
the North Atlantic Council, Feb. 26, 1993).
There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe than to have soldiers
from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new democracies work with
NATO to address their most pressing security problems. We believe NATO and our
Eastern colleagues should establish joint planning and training, and joint exercises for
peace-keeping.
Id. at 120. Indeed, this process has already begun. NATO has indicated informally that it
would intervene in a security matter if requested to do so by the United Nations or the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See Nicholas Doughty, NATO's New
Peace-keeping Plans to Include Combat, Reuter Library Report, Jan. 24, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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consensus for action on its very doorstep.217 NATO is clearly the
best developed multinational command' and control structure avail-
able,21 and represents on a regional level much of what the signato-
ries to the United Nations Charter had hoped for from a United
Nations collective security system.
NATO's utility outside Europe, however, is not as obvious.
NATO, or particular NATO members, may not be welcome in certain
political environments. While this problem can to some degree be
alleviated by omitting a particular nation from an operation or by
positioning NATO as the nucleus for a broader multinational coalition
similar to that assembled in the Persian Gulf War, the more multina-
tional such a force becomes, the more complicated command and
control issues become as well, thereby reducing the efficiency that
makes a NATO option appealing in the first place. More important-
ly, as the situation in Yugoslavia so vividly demonstrates, NATO
states may decide that a particular conflict is not in their interest and
may disagree among themselves over how or whether to respond.219
217. But see James Adams, NATO as Play-Doh. Why the Allied Forces in Europe Aren't
Ready to Move into Bosnia, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993, at C2 ("If NATO is unable to respond
to the Bosnian crisis, it is difficult to see how it can remain a credible defense organization.").
218. NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, Collective Security in the Post-Cold War World: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East and International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of David Abshire, Chair, Center for Strategic and
International Studies and former United States Ambassador to NATO) ("The NATO template
[for] joint operations and the staffing of NATO . . . is just the best in the world. They've
reached a degree of perfection."); see also Strobel, supra note 198 (comparing sophisticated
NATO command and control capability to almost nonexistent United Nations capability).
The NATO military organization consists of three primary elements: the NATO Military
Committee, the International Military Staff, and NATO theater commanders. The NATO
Military Committee is the highest military authority in NATO under the political authority of
the North Atlantic Council. The NATO Military Committee is comprised of the Chiefs of Staff
of each member nation except France. (France is represented by a military mission to the
Military Committee. Iceland is represented by a civilian.) The Chiefs of Staff normally meet
at least three times a year, however, each Chief of Staff appoints a permanent Military
Representative as a member of the Military Committee in permanent session. The NATO
Military Committee is responsible for developing NATO military plans and policies, training,
logistics, interoperability, communications, and intelligence, and exercises command authority
over the NATO theater commanders. See THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:
FACrS AND FIGURES 338-39 (11th ed. 1989).
219. One commentator has observed that:
[t]wo years ago, NATO claimed to have more than 3 million men and women under
arms. Today, that same organization is unable to find the 70,000 or so peacekeepers
needed for Bosnia .... This demonstrates ... how ill equipped the organization is to
deal with the problems posed in the post-Cold War era. Despite their enthusiasm for
finding a new role for NATO, its members seem to be only too keen to find excuses
to do nothing.
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C. A Need to Move Beyond Existing Models?
While conclusive judgements are premature, it remains possible
that the command and control model devised for United Nations
forces in Somalia will be successful; likewise, the NATO model may
yet prove useful in the former Yugoslavia. The question for both the
United States and the United Nations, however, is whether reliance
on these, and other ad hoe models, is sound policy in the long run.
From the United States perspective, the answer to this question
depends on its view of the proper role for the United Nations.
Clearly, there are those who believe that a weak United Nations is in
the United States's interest, or that the United Nations is too weak to
ever serve the United States's interests, and who will favor continued
ad hoc relationships.' Even among those who see a stronger
United Nations as a desirable United States goal, however, are those
who believe that ad hoc arrangements are adequate, desirable, and in
any event, all that are possible. Their reluctance to pursue a more
permanent United Nations security structure has several sources.
First, any proposal for reforming the United Nations security
capability would entail a transfer to the United Nations of both
authority and resources, and some believe the United Nations is
institutionally incapable of exercising that authority or using those
resources wisely?2' As even Ambassador Albright has observed,
Doughty, supra note 204.
220. See, eg., Ricardo Chavira, Who Will Keep the Peace?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
21, 1993, at J1 ("Analysts, particularly conservatives, also doubt that the U.S.-U.N. partnership
ideally meets American national security needs. Until a few years ago, they point out, the
United Nations was notorious for opposing U.S. interests."); William Satire, The Case for
'Compellance,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at A19 (describing President Clinton as "the captive
of his post-Vietnam multilateral rhetoric, so taken with fear of 'going it alone' that he is
incapable of going first"); George F. Will, Sovereignty and Sophistry, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
1993, at C7 (criticizing current proposals to revive Article 43 as an unwise derogation of United
States sovereignty advocated by those with "extravagant hopes [that] the United Nations could
relieve the United States of the burdens of being the only superpower").
221. See Management Structure of the United Nations, Hearing of International Security,
International Organizations, and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Federal News Service, Mar. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File (statement of Richard Thornburgh, former United Nations Under Secretary General for
Administration and Management); Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88, at 6 (statement of
Senator David Boren) ("I would agree with the United Nations' critics that the time for reform
is long overdue, that there must be a solid institutional foundation for any collective security
force."); John M. Goshko & Barton Gellman, Idea of a Potent U.N. Army Receives a Mixed
Response, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1992, at A22 (noting that many within the Department of
Defense are skeptical of the competence of United Nations peacekeeping authorities).
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"there are genuine questions at the moment about the U.N. having its
own anything."' Others doubt that the current cooperation on the
Security Council can be maintained and believe that any significant
investment in United Nations capabilities is ill-advised because of the
potential for conflict between member states.? Some worry that
vesting greater military capability in the United Nations will under-
mine the United Nations's important role as a mediator. 4
Even if these objections can be met and a more structured
approach is possible, some commentators dispute its necessity. The
Persian Gulf coalition and the UNITAF phase of the Somalia
intervention have demonstrated that successful command and control
structures can be organized on an ad hoe basis. The conflict in the
former Yugoslavia may yet prove NATO's potential as an additional
model. In each instance, United States leadership was, or may be,
able to galvanize support for a coalition tailor-made to the circum-
stances of a particular conflict. Moreover, advocates of this view
might argue that the energy and expense required to build a more
permanent organization is as intimidating, if not more so, than the
effort required to create forces and establish suitable command and
control arrangements in an ad hoc manner.' From this perspec-
tive, the United States's efforts are better spent continuing to nurture
222. Holmes, supra note 1, at Al.
223. See Paul H. Nitze, International Security in a New World, 81 GEo. LU. 481,488 (1993)
("[I]t remains to be seen whether the cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and China... will continue."); see also William Branigin, As China Builds Arsenal and Bases,
Asians Fear a 'Rogue in the Region,' WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1993, at A21 (detailing China's
recent military build-up and increased international assertiveness); Daniel Williams, Moscow's
Regional Interests May Threaten Cooperation With U.S., WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1993, at A18
(observing a move "toward a more assertive Russian foreign policy").
224. See, eg., John Gerard Ruggie, No, the World Doesn't Need a United Nations Army,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
[E]ven a move toward small-scale UN combat forces undermines the legitimacy of the
United Nations in international conflict resolution. The history of peacekeeping shows
that its strength lies in impartiality, the interposed character of its forces, and their
provision of support structures and services to peoples under stress. A compellence
capability potentially contradicts each of these.
Id.
225. Cf. MacKinlay & Chopra, supra note 134, at 123-24.
There are known disagreements on the use of force, intelligence, the maintenance of
law and order, powers of arrest, and the principles of logistic support. There will be
serious problems of equipment interoperability. There are enormous differences in
members' military experience and competence. Several important major power and
middle nations will be politically unable to participate in UN operations that have a
greater capacity to use force .... These problems do not constitute an overwhelming
reason to abandon the development of a more effective instrument to uphold the
Charter, but they do lead to a formidable dilemma.
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the worldwide network of bilateral relationships that proved so useful
for coalition building immediately prior to the Persian Gulf War.'
These are persuasive arguments, which may very well prove
correct. The continued reliance on an ad hoc approach, however, is
not without risks. Just as the hybrid model in Somalia was of little
value in the Yugoslavian context, the NATO model may not be
helpful in organizing a response to a conflict elsewhere? 7  If a
conflict develops tomorrow in a region where the United States
perceives that its vital interests are not at stake, as they appear not to
be in Somalia and Yugoslavia, the United States will have limited
alternatives.' One alternative will be to ignore the conflict and
anticipate that others will solve it. The current conflicts suggest,
however, that domestic indifference can no longer be relied on as a
basis for policyY9 Likewise, no nation other than the United States
has demonstrated the will or ability to organize an ad hoc response of
lasting value." ° Assuming that unilateral United States intervention
226. See, eg., Collective Security in the Post-Cold War World, Hearing Before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations,
and Human Rights, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File (statement of Alexander M. Haig, former Secretary of State).
[W]e need a coalition led by the United States that acts on behalf of democratic
principles, whether it is to prod U.N. action or if that is not possible, to take collective
action nonetheless. These coalitions are not always easy to form or to operate. But
... they are the best instrument we have to build the world we want .... [Flor some
reason, many pundits today would like to abandon [the idea of United States-led
coalitions as represented by NATO and the United States alliance with Japan] on
behalf of the nonexistent new world order or a U.N. manifestly unable to guarantee
the peace. As for me, I would like to be sure that the alternatives are workable before
we abandon the arrangements that took us safely through the Cold War and built up
successful democracies in Europe and Asia.
Id.
227. See generally Lewis, supra note 3, at A10; Strobel, supra note 198, at A10.
228. See Lewis, supra note 3, at A10 (predicting that Rwanda, Liberia, Ethiopia, Zaire, and
Georgia will be strong candidates for the next United Nations peacekeeping operation).
229. See CNN Specials: Our Planetary Police: Intervention Lessons Learned (CNN television
broadcast, Mar. 7, 1993), Transcript #320-5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File
(United Nations officials, academics, and journalists all agreeing that news coverage drives
governments to intervention they might otherwise wish to avoid); see also Goshko & Gellman,
supra note 221, at A24.
230. See, e.g., CNN Specials: Our Planetary Police Madeleine Albright Speaks Out (CNN
television broadcast Mar. 7, 1993), Transcript #320-4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File (statement of Madeleine Albright, United States Ambassador to United Nations)
("People look to the United States for leadership. They say over and over again, 'You now are
the only superpower. You are the ones that know how to exert leadership. Help us. Be our
leader."').
Although the United States is understandably reluctant to play the leadership role in
crises so far from its shores, countries... look to the United States, not the European
Community or the United Nations, for leadership. As the only superpower, the United
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will be an unacceptable alternative, the only remaining option is for
the United States to take the lead in assembling an ad hoc coalition.
As previously discussed, this approach may be useful in certain
circumstances, but it is not without drawbacks of its own."
V. TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY VISION FOR UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL
Unless the United States and United Nations are willing to rely
on existing models for the command and control of future United
Nations operations, they must consider possibilities for creating a
more enduring structure. While the Clinton Administration appears
to have recognized this reality, the* experience in Somalia has also
forced the President to recognize that neither the American people
nor the United Nations were fully prepared for the respective
sacrifices and challenges inherent in the United Nations command of
United States forces in a difficult peace enforcement mission.
A. Clinton Administration Proposals for Improving United Nations
Capabilities
In his September 27,1993, address to the United Nations General
Assembly, President Clinton expressed support for continued United
Nations peacekeeping missions, and also pledged to "support the
creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping headquarters with a
planning staff with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit
that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a modern operations
center with global communications." 2
Perhaps what is most noteworthy about the President's address,
however, is what he did not say. In the weeks prior to the President's
address, media reports indicated strong support at the subcabinet level
for a draft Presidential Decision Directive 13 (PDD-13), a document
designed to serve as a comprehensive policy guidance to senior
officials regarding Administration policy toward the United Na-
States may not want special responsibilities, but, like it or not, the United States has
them.
139 CONG. RIc. H1227 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Skelton).
231. See Senate Persian Gulf Hearing, supra note 83, at 703; Russett & Sutterlin, supra note
87, at 76-77.
232. See President Bill Clinton Addresses the General Assembly of the United Nations, supra
note 10, at 7.
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tions.' 3  The draft PDD-13 contained several changes in United
States policy toward the United Nations. To begin with, previous
United States involvement in United Nations missions was limited to
situations in which the United States could make a "unique military
contribution" to the mission, i.e., no other state could provide the
capability. Draft PDD-13 proposed, however, that the President
authorize participation in any peacekeeping operation, in any
capacity, so long as such participation served United States inter-
ests.235
An additional aspect of the draft PDD-13 that attracted consider-
able attention was the document's proposal that United States forces
serve under United Nations commanders, i.e., the fact that a United
Nations operation would be commanded by a non-American would
no longer prevent United States forces from serving under the
officer's command2 6  While the criticism this proposal received
from legislators and editorial writers gave the impression that this was
a radical step forward, 7 in fact, media reports of the draft's sub-
stance indicated that the Administration intended to retain a degree
of control over the United States forces committed to United Nations
command that would have dramatically limited the new policy's
impact. The draft reportedly provided, for example, that the
immediate commanders of United States forces serving under United
Nations commands would maintain a separate chain of command to
United States authorities, and that the commanders would have been
authorized to disregard orders that were judged beyond the United
Nations mandate for the operation. 8 In addition, the commanders
of United States forces would have had the authority to disregard
orders that were "illegal or 'militarily imprudent." ' 239  Taken
together, these reservations would have guaranteed that United States
233. See Barton Gellman, U.S. Reconsiders Putting GIs Under U.N., WASH. POST, Sept. 22,
1993, at 1; Sciolino, supra note 7, at AS.
234. Cf. Smith & Preston, supra note 4, at Al.
235. Id.
236. See sources cited supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing past examples of
foreign control of United States soldiers).
237. See sources cited supra note 8 (describing Senate reaction to placing troops under
foreign command).
238. See Gellman, supra note 7, at Al.
239. Id. This draft provision was later modified after vigorous protests from the Secretary
General that such a policy would inevitably lead to chaos as other nations would feel compelled
to adopt similar policies. The revised draft provided that United States participants in United
Nations commands would first be required to appeal a questionable order up the United Nations
chain of command before raising the issue with their commanders.
19931
48 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:1
forces serving under United Nations commanders would not, in fact,
be under total United Nations "command."
The draft PDD-13 also took a conservative approach with regard
to United States willingness to make advance commitments of forces,
facilities, and equipment to United Nations operations. For example,
during their respective confirmation hearings, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher and United Nations Ambassador Madeleine
Albright expressed support for exploring the possibility of creating a
United Nations "rapid deployment force" and for negotiating Article
43 agreements with the United Nations.2' Both were echoing the
support for a rapid deployment force expressed by President Clinton
in the months preceding his election.24 The draft PDD-13, howev-
240. See Confirmation Hearing for Warren Christopher as Secretary of State before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Federal News Service, Jan. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Libary, CURRNT File (statement of Warren Christopher) ("[M]y general feeling is to support
[the establishment of a permanent stand-by force for peacekeeping operations], or at least
support the exploration of how that can be done."); see also Confirmation Hearing for Madeleine
Albright as United States Ambassador to the United Nations before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Federal News Service, Jan. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File.
[W]e need to really explore and think about how we use the various options that we
have for fulfilling the promise of Article 43. President Clinton has spoken about the
importance of creating a rapid deployment force or a force that would be available to
deal with problems .... I think that we ought to give life to Article 43 and I think that
what we need to do is to make sure that our constitutional prerogatives are properly
preserved and that we in fact see how we can create a way that the United Nations can
have some teeth.
Id. For a discussion of Article 43, see supra notes 20, 22 and accompanying text.
241. See Governor Bill Clinton, Statement to the United Nations Association of the USA
(UNA-USA) (Sept. 1992) (on file with the author). It seems reasonable to conclude that then-
Governor Clinton was receiving considerable advice from those inclined to support a greatly
expanded United States partnership with the United Nations. See, e.g., Special Report:
Policymaking for a New Era, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93, at 175, 187-88 (containing the
recommendations of a bipartisan commission to the then President-elect on United States policy
toward the United Nations). Prior to his current appointment, Director of Central Intelligence
R. James Woolsey chaired a study that advocated a more formal United States military
relationship with the United Nations. See UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION, PARTNERS FOR
PEACE, STRENGTHENING COLLECTIVE SECURITY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 32-33 (1992). The
authors proposed a three-tier United Nations force. The first tier would involve a small, ready-
reaction force of a few units under permanent United Nations command; the second, a rapid
deployment force of "several tens of thousands of troops" that could be transferred from
national armies under a unified United Nations command on short notice; the third, large-scale
forces under a unified United Nations command capable of mounting a major military operation
such as the Persian Gulf campaign against Iraq.
A more formal United States military commitment to the United Nations has had support
in Congress as well, with the most active and detailed support coming from Senate Foreign
Relations Committee member Joseph Biden and Senate Intellgience Committee Chair David
Boren. Senator Boren has actively advocated the creation of a United Nations rapid
deployment force. During the 102d Congress, Senator Biden introduced SJ. Res. 325, which
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er, stopped well short of these ambitious proposals. In addition to
failing to endorse the initiation of Article 43 negotiations or creation
of a rapid deployment force, the draft PDD-13 failed to make any
advance commitment to supply the United Nations with even the
most generic capabilities, such as combat engineering or air cover.242
Instead, the United States would have evaluated mission requirements
on a case by case basis, and would have provided United States
assistance to the extent such assistance is consistent with perceived
United States interests.243
As demonstrated by the foregoing, the draft PDD-13 embodied
a relatively conservative approach toward creation of a more
comprehensive United States security relationship with the United
Nations.2' The President's failure to endorse many of the initiatives
proposed in the draft PDD-13 demonstrates how politically difficult
it had become to support further United Nations initiatives. Thus,
while the Administration's retreat from earlier objectives is under-
standable and reflects a degree of necessary realism, the United States
has proposed little that will alter command and control structures for
future United Nations operations. While the commitment to an
expanded capablity United Nations headquarters is important,
"command and control" also encompasses important issues regarding
the distribution of authority between the Security Council, the
Secretary General, troop contributing states, and military commanders
in the field. These issues, however, remain unaddressed. Until the
features of a comprehensive command and control structure are
addressed, the United States and United Nations should expect
continued uncertainty regarding the willingness of states to contribute
forces to United Nations operations and the willingness of states to
support United Nations operations once they are underway.
encouraged President Bush to begin negotiating an Article 43 agreement with the Security
Council. See SJ. Res. 325, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 138 CONG. REC. S9853 (daily ed., July
2, 1992). During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Resolution 325, Senators
Biden, Boren, Paul Simon, and Committee Chair Claiborne Pell all expressed support for the
negotiation of an Article 43 agreement as well as the creation of some form of United Nations
force. See generally Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88. In addition to the aforementioned
senators, Mr. Woolsey also testified in support of their respective proposals.
242. Gellman, supra note 7, at Al.
243. IdL
244. But see sources cited supra note 242.
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B. Toward a Neo-Charter Model of Command and Control
What principles should guide the development of a United
Nations command and control structure adequate for the demands of
the post-cold war world? First, any nation seeking to enjoy the
benefits of a truly collective security system must recognize that the
price is increased United Nations political control over particular
operations. To be effective, the United Nations must be credible; to
be credible, the United Nations must exercise political control over
the operations conducted in its name. The United States should not
reflexively oppose this change: when a state acts alone, it risks failing
alone; even when it succeeds, success may carry an exorbitant price.
If nothing else, self-interest dictates that the United States be willing,
under the proper circumstances, to cede a degree of decision-making
authority to the Security Council'and Secretary General.
The case for reform, however, involves more than merely
returning control of all operations to the Security Council and its
agent, the Secretary General. First, states contributing forces to an
operation should be asked to cede decision-making authority over
their forces only if the decision-making surrogate is competent to be
trusted with life and death decisions. Likewise, any nation making a
large troop contribution to a particular operation should have a voice
in the operation commensurate with its contribution. While the
United Nations is beginning to make informal progress on both these
fronts,245 much remains to be done. Moreover, there is no institu-
tional structure in place to ensure the continuity of this process.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the United Nations
should consider a break with cold war tradition by creating a unified
structure for command and control over the entire range of United
Nations operations. Today, the United Nations must be capable of
managing peacekeeping at one end of the conflict continuum and
enforcement at the other end, and, with increasing frequency, the
difficult "peace enforcement" missions lying somewhere in between.
The continued separation of infrastructure management from
operational command and control of peacekeeping and enforcement
245. See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All
Their Aspects, Special Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess. para. 23, U.N. Doc A/47/253 (1992) [hereinafter Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations Report]; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 44; Lewis, supra note 3, at A10.
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functions is inconsistent with a world where disputants increasingly
refuse to recognize such distinctions.
These principles are not radical; indeed, in many respects, they
infused the original Chapter VII model. Today, the challenge lies in
developing a contemporary model that incorporates the strengths of
the system envisioned in 1945 without ignoring the experiences of
intervening years. In short, what is needed is a "neo-Charter" model
for command and control-a model that reaffirms the Chapter VII
principles of collective security, authentic Security Council oversight
of United Nations operations, and big power superintendence of all
peace and security matters, while assimilating the contributions of the
Secretary General and a host of middle and smaller states.
1. Reaffirming the Security Council's Political Control over
United Nations Operations. Although the signatories to the United
Nations Charter intended for the Security Council to exercise political
control over United Nations operations, the Security Council has
generally been unable or unwilling to perform this function. In the
peacekeeping context, vague Security Council mandates have often
created ambiguity where peacekeepers and disputants would have
been better served by clarity;246 in the enforcement context, broad
mandates have created at least the potential for overreaching on the
part of state actors executing United Nations mandates.247
This history is cause for concern at a time when the need for a
more effective United Nations is dire. After all, if the purpose of a
collective security system is to express and execute the security
preferences of the international community, the system is surely
weakened when its agent takes only a limited role in clarifying the
political objectives of operations conducted in the community's name.
The Security Council should move, as it demonstrated some willing-
ness to do in Somalia,' to exercise more dynamic political control
over operations conducted under its authority.
Even in a post-cold war environment, however, this will not be
easy. While there is obvious reason to believe that political consensus
246. See e.g., DURcH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 39-42; Indar Jit Rikhye, The Future
of Peacekeeping, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, supra note 96, at 170, 175-76.
247. See generally supra notes 47-58,66-68 and accompanying text (asserting that the United
States had complete authority over military matters, and almost complete control over political
decisions, through the force of the Unified Command, which was established after unanimity
among the Security Council members was no longer possible).
248. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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among the five permanent Security Council members will be more
easily achieved than during the cold war, recent events demonstrate
how the limited interests of one member can still impede a unified
Security Council position on a vital concern. 9 In such circum-
stances, a deliberately ambiguous mandate may be the only device
that permits international action of any kind.5' As long as the
international community chooses to vest constitutional authority for
the authorization of force in a Security Council governed by veto,
there seems to be no way of avoiding this problem. This should not,
however, prevent the Security Council from exercising more assertive
control in those instances in which consensus is possible.
There is, however, yet another obstacle to greater Security
Council control. Even if consensus regarding the aims of an
operation exists within the Security Council, there remains the issue
of authority over forces responsible for carrying out the operation-an
issue that will persist as long as the United Nations relies on a single
state or managed coalition of states to conduct United Nations
operations. In response to this dilemma, some have suggested that
the United Nations ought to require future single-state or coalition
force commanders to consult with, or be subject to, the Security
Council (or some form of military authority appointed by the Council)
regarding the political objectives and strategic direction of the
operation.' This, it is suggested, would enable the United Nations
249. See, e.g., Julia Preston, United Nations Tightens Yugoslav Sanctions, WASH. PoST, Apr.
18, 1993, at Al (describing difficult Security Council negotiations with Russia prior to the
Russian referendum regarding a resolution to intensify trade sanctions against Yugoslavia in
order to increase pressure on the Serbs to cease attacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
250. DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 41; see also Horst, supra note 133, at 268-69
(noting the need to strike a balance in drafting a mandate sufficiently precise to prevent any
misunderstanding over objectives but sufficiently vague to allow flexibility in the face of changed
circumstances).
251. See Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 87, at 77-78.
One [solution] would be a variant of the procedure followed in Korea. National forces
could be brought together in ad hoe fashion under a unified U.N. command, with the
commander designated by whichever happened to be the major troop-contributing
country. The problems that arose in the Korean case could conceivably be alleviated
if the unified commander were required to consult with the Security Council, or with
some form of military authority appointed by the council, on the mission of the military
operation and the basic strategy to be followed in achieving it.... It would have the
distinct advantage of maintaining a close U.N. identification with all action taken and
of giving the Security Council some influence, if not control, over any military action.
Id.; see also MacKinlay & Chopra, supra note 134, at 124-29 (proposing that future operations
might be conducted by a single state or managed coalition which would take political and
strategic direction from the Security Council and Secretary General).
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
to accomplish United Nations objectives without losing control over
United Nations operations.
While the idea of Security Council control and mandatory
consultation is potentially useful and, in fact, was employed, at least
in theory, during the UNITAF phase of the Somalia operation,' 2
there are at least two significant issues that it leaves unaddressed.
First, there traditionally has been no capacity within the United
Nations to provide military direction of any kind. 3  Thus, the
notion of the United Nations "controlling" operations is, at least at
the moment, unrealistic. Second, although the United Nations may
have leverage to insist on control or consultation when the single-state
or managed-coalition commander desires United Nations legitimiza-
tion of an operation, the United Nations's leverage fades when an
operation is less in the single state's or managed coalition's interest.
In these cases, it will be difficult enough to persuade a single state or
managed coalition to act at all, let alone cede control of its forces to
the Security Council and Secretariat.
Thus, while Security Council control over United Nations
operations is a desirable goal, it is not an inevitable consequence of
the changed international environment. If the Security Council is
ultimately to regain the control envisioned for it by the Charter
signatories, it must promote two distinct and fundamental changes.
First, the Security Council must encourage the development of a
capacity within the United Nations for managing complex multination-
al operations; second, it should promote development of a greater
capacity within and between states to conduct the peace enforcement
operations the United Nations seems likely to confront. The
successful achievement of both of these goals will depend, in large
measure, on the extent to which all participants perceive they are able
to cooperate without compromising their vital interests. A state will
be more likely to cede control of its forces to a multinational
command structure if it is confident it will have an input into the
command decisions commensurate with its contribution, and that the
command is competent to receive and act upon this input. This
suggests the need for a confidence-building structure that allocates
authority for political, strategic, administrative, and operational
decision-making in a predictable and mutually satisfactory fashion.
252. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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Today, however, such a structure does not exist. What follows are
steps the Security Council might consider to promote such a structure.
2. Affirming the Secretary General's Executive Role. While
Chapter VII originally envisioned that the Security Council would
receive its primary assistance in peace and security matters from the
Military Staff Committee, forty-eight years of experience suggests that
this mantle should fall today on the Secretary General. From
Hammarskjold's initiation of UNEF through Boutros-Ghali's central
role in the Somalia operation, the Secretary General has become the
source of focus and direction for United Nations military and
paramilitary operations. The Secretary General, as the United
Nations's chief executive, is institutionally positioned both to provide
the Security Council with focused recommendations and to execute
Security Council mandates with efficiency and dispatch.' In
addition, the Secretary General gives the Security Council a necessary,
if not always welcome, political perspective it would not receive from
a panel of its own military officers. Thus, the Military Staff Commit-
tee, or any other group of military advisors, should report to the
Security Council through the Secretary GeneralP 5
The fact that the Charter signatories made no mention of the
Secretary General in Chapter VII does not prohibit the Security
Council from placing military advisors at the Secretary General's
disposal. The Charter makes clear, for example, that the Military
Staff Committee "serves at the pleasure of the Security Council. ',1 6
The three articles dealing with the Military Staff Committee-Articles
45, 46, and 47-all use the word "assistance" when describing the
Military Staff Committee's function vis-a-vis the Security Council. 7
If the Security Council determines that the Military Staff Committee
or some other military advisory body could best provide "assistance"
254. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Role of the U.N. Secretary Genera" Some Legal
Aspects, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & PoL. 161 (1991) (describing some of the legal aspects of the
Secretary General's position such as term of office and selection, as well as administrative,
coordination, and political functions).
255. See Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88, at 40 (statement of Leon A. Edney, former
Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command) ("Strategic guidance and policy should
come from the heads of state through the Secretary General to the military staff committee.").
Butsee UNrrED NATIONS ASSOCIATION, supra note 241, at 36 ("[For broad policy and strategic
guidance, the commander of [a] multinational force should look not to the Secretary General
but to the Military Staff Committee.").
256. David Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 46, at 101, 106.
257. Id
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by reporting through the Secretary General, the Charter will not
contradict this determination. 8
3. Creating a More Effective United Nations Command Capabili-
ty.
a. Current changes within the Secretariat. A fundamental
reason why the United States and other militarily capable states have
been reluctant to place their forces at the disposal of the United
Nations is its lack of a headquarters for military planning and
command capability. 9 The Military Staff Committee has been
dormant since 1948, and, despite a central role in peacekeeping
operations, the Secretary General's military staff has long been a
borderline operation incapable of managing modem military
operations. There is strong evidence today, however, that this
situation may be changing.
Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi
Annan has announced his plans to (1) develop a twenty-four hour
operations center within the Secretariat, staffed with over one
hundred officers, (2) enhance peacekeeping intelligence capabilities,
(3) reorganize the peacekeeping department to develop a permanent
258. As Scheffer has observed, "there is a considerable degree of flexibility that can be
accommodated in the operation of the Military Staff Committee." Id.
259. See, eg., Goshko & Gellman, supra note 221, at A22.
260. See Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations Report, supra note 245, at para. 23
(noting the "obvious necessity to strengthen substantially the Secretariat capability to plan,
mount, coordinate and sustain peace-keeping operations"). For a revealing description of how
the United Nations peacekeeping infrastructure has weakened, see MacKinlay & Chopra, supra
note 134, at 115.
[T]here [has been] little pressure on [peacekeepers] to be militarily effective. In the
field, there was no need for total operational reliability by day and night, and gaps in
logistic arrangements were tolerated because they did not diminish results. This in turn
removed pressure on the Secretariat to maintain an effective staff capability in New
York. There was seldom any need, or facility, to maintain elaborate map rooms, with
24-hour vigilance and daily situation briefings. When the need arose, contingency
planning could be carried out by co-opted staff officers who came and went on an ad
hoc basis. Operational lessons were lost, UN equipment became obsolete, and military
functions were largely conducted by a largely civilian Secretariat. Although the
deployment of each new peacekeeping force began with minor blunders, once the
modus operandi was established, lessons were soon forgotten. With the cold war
stalemate in the Security Council, member nations had no incentive to improve military
competence.
Ld. For an operational perspective on United Nations headquarters support, see Simon Jones,
Gen. MacKenzie slams U.N.'s nine-to-flvers, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 31, 1993, at 12 (quoting
Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie, former head of United Nations forces in Sarajevo,
as describing the United Nations as an incompetent "nine-to-five civilian operation.... Do not
get into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 p.m. New York time, or Saturday and
Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone.").
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planning unit for future operations, and (4) increase the size of his
personal staff21
In addition, the Military Advisor's office has begun plans to
establish a stand-by peacekeeping force for which member states will
be asked to provide troops and equipment on short notice for new
missions, thereby avoiding the long delays that have plagued earlier
operations. 2
These are positive developments. What remains unclear,
however, is whether the changes currently planned will be sufficient
to make a difference in the long term. In addition to strengthening
its capacity to support ongoing peacekeeping operations (which the
current plans seem to do), the Secretariat should consider what
specific steps it might take to encourage member states to enhance
their individual and collective capacities to confront the "peace
enforcement" missions that seem so likely in the future. Many of the
nations that traditionally participate in peacekeeping operations are
ill-equipped to deal with the new demands of "peace enforce-
ment., 263 If peacekeepers intend to do more than passively monitor
these "second generation" aggressions,' they will require new
training and the ability to perform coordinated operations in a
multinational context.' Larger, more enforcement-oriented powers
such as the United States can play a vital role in this process by
offering both resources and expertise. Likewise, larger powers
261. See Lewis, supra note 3, at A10.
262. According to the current Military Advisor, General Maurice Baril, by the end of 1993
the Secretariat hoped to have a data bank that will list what sort of support each country is
prepared to give.
Then, when the secretary-general takes a political decision, we can punch it out in the
computer and say, 'We can have 5,000 men ready in seven days coming from these
seven countries.' Short of a standing army, which would be nice, this is the way ahead.
Ferguson, supra note 107, at A17. Creation of peacekeeping stand-by units would fulfill a need
recognized by "some delegations." See Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations Report,
supra note 245, para. 17, see also An Agenda for Peace, supra note 138, para. 51.
263. See Weiss, supra note 145, at 61 ("Accomplishing the tasks in these operations would
go far beyond both the expectations and the capacities of most countries that have contributed
troops to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War.").
264. For a general discussion of "second generation" operations, see MacKinlay & Chopra,
supra note 134, at 116-18.
265. Weiss, supra note 145, at 61 ("[Peace enforcement operations] would require a level of
military professionalism and discipline not commonly found in previous UN peacekeeping
operations. They would necessitate participation by the armies of major powers.").
266. See, eg., DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 31, 88-89 (noting the essential
contributions the permanent members can make but stating that operational military
participation will be unwise if it would threaten the United Nations's reputation for even-
handedness by making peacekeeping operations appear to be an instrument of domination by
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can learn from states that have become expert in the peacekeeping
methods that remain relevant in the new environment. Today, no one
can claim a monopoly of expertise with respect to the challenges
posed by the new "peace enforcement" missions. All of this suggests
that the planning and support of such operations should be accom-
plished within a single organization that integrates the assets of the
traditional peacekeeping states as well as of the larger powers.
This proposed "militarization" of the peacekeeping bureaucracy
will no doubt make some nervous. When the Secretary General
called for a revival of the Military Staff Committee in An Agenda for
Peace, for example, he was quick to add that "the role of the Military
Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and
not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations., 267
His reluctance to involve the major military powers in peacekeeping
operations is representative of deep-seated suspicion of military might
held by United Nations Secretariat personnel as well as by a number
of smaller and traditional peacekeeping states.26 While the sources
of these misgivings are varied, one of the most significant concerns is
that a failure to maintain a clear distinction between enforcement and
peacekeeping will compromise the neutrality so essential for the
latter's success.2 69  Tis is indeed a legitimate concern with respect
to the composition of peacekeeping forces as well as the willingness
of such forces to use power. Even as cold war memories fade, it is
conceivable that the presence of a major power would inhibit the
the great powers); Rikhye, supra note 93, at 40 ("There is a pressing need for the United
Nations to have available expertise in the conduct of limited police actions. Consideration
should be given to engaging the [Military Staff Committee] for this purpose.").
267. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 138, para. 43.
268. See Augustus R. Norton & Thomas G. Weiss, Rethinking Peacekeeping, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, supra note 96, at 22, 29-30. Some states may harbor lingering
cold war fears and resentment of superpower exploitation, while others, often those with military
juntas in their past, share an aversion to all things military and find it difficult to countenance
greater military influence in what has been, from their perspective, a relatively pacifist
enterprise. DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 16. It seems these fears can be partially
addressed by keeping cold war and colonial powers on the operational sidelines in appropriate
circumstances. ld.
269. This theme was prominent during the August 1992 deliberations of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which issued a special report commenting on various
aspects of An Agenda for Peace. A number of states expressed strong reservations about the
more aggressive aspects of An Agenda for Peace, including the concern that peace enforcement
would compromise the neutrality of operations and could lead to a general tendency to
overemphasize military solutions. See Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Report,
supra note 245, paras. 21, 40, 43.
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success of certain missionsY' Likewise, the disciplined nonuse of
force will remain the key to the success of many missions 7 1
Recognition of these realities, however, should not prevent the
United Nations from developing a headquarters organization that is
capable of supporting those operations that demand more than
traditional peacekeeping, nor should it prevent the United Nations
from playing a key role in accelerating the development of a greater
multilateral capacity to conduct such operations. If the United
Nations hopes to be relevant in the era of "peace enforcement," the
Secretariat must be sufficiently flexible, and multinational forces must
be sufficiently versatile, to conduct operations across all points on the
conflict continuum. "Peace enforcement" scenarios may not always
offer the luxury of a methodical transition between the force capabili-
ties suited for different phases of an operation. If new capacities are
to be developed to confront these exigencies, it seems clear that the
traditional peacekeeping states must be capable-at least in certain
conditions-of employing greater force, and that the larger powers
such as the United States can no longer remain aloof from active
planning and participation.
b. Creating a United Nations Peace and Security Commit-
tee. While many of the current developments within the Secretariat
are encouraging, it is reasonable to ask whether the process should
continue to evolve informally or whether an effort should be made to
institutionalize these and other necessary changes. There are at least
two reasons why an informal approach may be wise. First, any
attempts to institutionalize an enhanced Secretariat staff might
actually impede further progress: certain states may be willing to
allow Under Secretary General Annan (and his United States
supporters) to build an enhanced staff, but may be unwilling or
unable to formally approve this development. In addition, from the
United States perspective, an informal process seems likely to provide
significant flexibility and influence while minimizing opportunities for
interference that a more formal structure might promote.
Even so, a case can be made that a failure to promote an
institutional basis for the emerging capability may be short-sighted.
Establishment of a permanent Secretariat staff, complete with a clear
270. See DURCH & BL.ECHMAN, supra note 103, at 89 (noting that big power states "should
never be included in an operation if that would threaten the United Nations's reputation for
disinterested even-handedness").
271. See Urquhart, supra note 130, at 202.
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mission statement, established personnel assignment procedures,
professional development programs, etc., could help guarantee the
successful (and efficient) evolution of the process currently underway.
Apart from the benefits that institutionalization may provide the
United Nations as a whole, there are also parochial reasons why the
United States may wish to pursue more permanent arrangements.
While the United States currently exercises considerable influence
within the United Nations peace and security bureaucracy, it is not
clear to what extent this is a function of a dominant troop contribu-
tion to what is currently the United Nations's biggest operation. It
may be wise to use the current opportunity to fashion a more
permanent structure that will help guarantee a continued influence
which is not dependent on the contribution of massive forces to a
particular operation.
If the United States is to promote a new peace and security
structure within the United Nations, what should its significant
features be? Clearly, any discussion of a military staff organization
within the United Nations must begin with the Military Staff
Committee. While there has been considerable discussion lately
concerning a revival of the Military Staff Committee, a number of
observers, including the Secretary General, 2 have rightly acknowl-
edged that the Military Staff Committee, as currently constituted, is
not representative of the states that shoulder much of the peace and
security burden. 3  Thus, while the Military Staff Committee might
serve as the basis for a new military advisory body within the United
Nations, perhaps the ideal staff would integrate the current Military
Staff Committee member state capabilities with the experience of
states that have served on peacekeeping's front lines.
272. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 138, para. 43 (advocating support of the Military Staff
Committee to the Security Council in negotiating Article 43 agreements); cf. Weiss, supra note
145, at 58 (arguing that the wisdom of Boutros-Ghali's proposal in An Agenda for Peace to
revive the Military Staff Committee is "doubtful").
273. UNrrED NATIoNS AssoCATION, supra note 241, at 39 (suggesting the possible need to
improve Military Staff Committee membership by including senior officers in order to provide
advice in an enforcement context); see also Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88, at 40
(statement of Leon A. Edney). Former Military Advisor and Retired Indian Major General
Indar Jit Rikhye does not address the membership issue, but foresees only a limited role for the
Military Staff Committee, proposing that the Military Staff Committee provide advice only "in
the conduct of limited police actions." Rikhye, supra note 246, at 40. Rikhye reasons that states
will wish to maintain complete control of "major enforcement actions," and that peacekeeping
is best managed by the Secretary General. ld. at 37, 39.
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This formula offers several advantages. First, by including
current Military Staff Committee members, it draws upon their many
assets (and hopefully encourages their political support). By assimilat-
ing a limited number of traditional peacekeeping states, it draws upon
their expertise while acknowledging, within practical limits, the
important contributions of medium- and small-sized states to the
maintenance of peace and security in the contemporary environment.
Both groups of states could be integrated in a single organization
where decisions are taken by consensus, or, failing consensus, by some
form of majority vote, so as not to paralyze the committee.
While the creation of a new United Nations Peace and Security
Committee could be accomplished under Article 47(2), which provides
that the Military Staff Committee can invite any United Nations
member state to be "associated" with the Military Staff Committee
when "the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities [so]
requires,"' 4 it is arguably more appropriate for the Security Council
to establish the new staff under the authority of Article 29, which
provides that "[t]he Security Council may establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."'275
Establishing the committee as a subsidiary organ would suggest a
permanence that is lacking in Article 47. The subsidiary organ would
also send a signal to the new members that they are equal partners in
the enterprise and not merely participants at Military Staff Committee
sufferance.
The new Peace and Security Committee might perform many of
the functions originally intended for the Military Staff Committee.
The Charter provides that the Military Staff Committee shall advise
the Security Council on "military requirements,"276 and also that the
Military Staff Committee should assist the Security Council in making
"[p]lans for the application of armed force."2' While neither func-
tion has ever been defined, it seems reasonable, with or without
Article 43 special agreements, to read these provisions as a mandate
for "force planning" to include: force structure decisions, negotiation
of necessary standby agreements, planning of joint training exercises,
and development of national contingent training programs. As Under
Secretary General Annan has recognized, these functions will be
274. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 2.
275. Id. art. 29.
276. Id. art. 47, para. 1.
277. Id. art. 46.
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necessary if the United Nations is to develop a more advanced
enforcement capability than it currently possesses. The proposed
Peace and Security Staff Committee would, of course, require staff
support. While the organizational details and personnel assignment
policies of such a staff are beyond the scope of this Article, it could
resemble the staff currently being constructed in the Secretariat. 278
4. Involving Troop Contributors in Strategic Direction. While
the proposed Peace and Security Committee seems capable of making
its most valuable contributions in the realm of force planning, it is less
clear whether it has a contribution to make in other areas originally
designed for Military Staff Committee involvement. This is particular-
ly true of the strategic direction function. While professional strategic
direction remains a vital part of any military operation, a strong case
can be made that the Security Council and Secretary General should
be assisted in this regard not by a large standing committee, but by a
smaller group composed of the states that put their forces at risk in
service of particular United Nations missions. The rationale is
straightforward: the more control nations have over deployment of
their forces by a United Nations command, the more likely they will
be to commit their forces to such a command.
To some extent, the objective of contributing state control has
been served in the past by assigning the force commander and deputy
force commander from states making significant troop contribu-
tions. 79 This practice, however, provides representation for only a
few states. In addition, it does nothing to address the lack of
representation that currently exists at the strategic level. Once forces
have been committed to a United Nations operation, there is no
278. Alternatively, such a staff might be patterned on the NATO model. The NATO
Military Committee is supported by the International Military Staff, which is comprised of about
150 officers, 150 enlisted personnel, and 100 civilian employees. Military personnel are generally
seconded from national military establishments. The Director of the International Military Staff
is normally:
an officer of three-star rank who is nominated by the member nations and selected by
the Military Committee. He or she may be from any of the member nations but must
be a different nationality than the Chairman of the Military Committee. The Director
is assisted by six Assistant Directors of flag or general officer rank.
NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 218, at 338-39. As the executive agent of the
Military Committee, the International Military Staff is responsible for ensuring that the policies
and decisions of the Military Committee are implemented as directed. Id. at 340-43.
279. Cf. UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION, supra note 241, at 36 ("[I]n any situation where
a substantial share of the forces mobilized for an enforcement operation comes from a single
country, the nation supplying them will have a justifiable claim to furnish the commander of the
multinational force.").
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established mechanism through which troop contributing states can
provide input on the use of their forces in a particular operation.'
To say that there is no established mechanism for troop contribu-
tor participation is not to say that the Charter provides no basis for
troop contributor participation. Indeed, the signatories attempted to
address this issue in two separate articles. Article 44 requires the
Security Council to invite a potential troop contributor to "participate
in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment
of contingents of that Member's armed forces."'" Article 44,
however, has never been invoked.
Article 47(2) also provides a basis for contributing state input
into deployment decisions, providing that:
[a]ny Member of the United Nations not permanently represented
on the [Military Staff] Committee shall be invited by the Commit-
tee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the
Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that
Member in its work.m
This language contains several ambiguities. First, it is not clear "when
the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the
participation" of troop contributors. In addition, even if a troop
contributor is invited to "be associated" with the committee, it is
unclear what this right of association involves. Presumably an
associated state would be given some input into strategic decision-
making, though the parameters of that input are unclear.
The Security Council could benefit from the flexibility in Articles
44 and 47(2) by creating a structure to ensure that troop contributing
states have the maximum possible voice in the strategic direction of
their forces. This could be accomplished by creating strategic councils
of troop contributing states to advise the Secretary General on the
strategic direction of United Nations forces. Membership on the
councils would not be permanent, but would vary depending on the
280. See, eg., Alan Ferguson, 'Big Five' Still Dominate Key United Nations Decisions,
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 11, 1993, at F1 (asserting that major Security Council decisions are made
at secret meetings of "the permanent five"). There has been extensive consultation between the
United States and the United Nations throughout the course of the Somalia intervention. For
a description of the consultative mechanisms established between the United Nations and the
United States with respect to Somalia, see Report of 3 March, supra note 152, para. 7. See also
Stanley Meisler, U.S., U.N. Apparently Agree on Somali Command, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 23,1993,
at A19 (reporting that despite "public bickering," Boutros-Ghali consulted extensively with the
United States while preparing his March 3 report to the Security Council, and, as a result, the
United States did not expect to be "surprised or troubled in any way by his conclusions").
281. U.N. CHARTER art. 44.
282. Id. art. 47, para. 2.
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composition of a particular operation. These strategic councils would
have no authority to exercise command over deployed forces, but the
Secretary General would be required to consult with the councils. In
addition, they would be the preferred means for the communication
of military guidance to deployed forces.W
Because the purpose of a strategic council would be to ensure a
voice for those nations making the largest personnel contributions to
a particular United Nations operation, factors such as geographical
diversity and ideological representation would carry little weight in
determining membership for each council. For example, if Turkey,
Belgium, and India were the three largest troop contributors in a
particular operation, they would hold seats on the strategic council for
that operation. Likewise, if the United States, Great Britain, and
France were the largest contributors, they would fill strategic council
seats. The largest troop contributing state might serve as chair of the
council and would speak on its behalf; of course, other members
would not be prevented from expressing dissenting views.'
The proposal to create an institutionalized role for troop
contributors raises an interesting issue of Charter interpretation.
Article 47(3) states that the Military Staff Committee shall be
responsible for strategic direction "under the Security Council."'
While the Security Council can direct the Military Staff Committee to
perform its strategic direction function under the direction of the
Secretary General (either on its own accord or as part of an Article
29 Peace and Security Committee), the Charter's plain language does
not clearly indicate that the Security Council may completely divest
the Military Staff Committee of its strategic direction function.286
283. Parallel lines of communication would be required for peacekeeping operations,
requiring the Special Representative to communicate directly with the Secretary General, and
the strategic council to communicate with the force commander on military matters.
284. The idea to provide troop contributing nations an institutionalized voice in the Secretary
General's decision-making process is not unprecedented. See supra notes 109-18 and
accompanying text.
285. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 3.
286. As long as Article 43 agreements are not in place, this provision may be no restraint
at all. Under Article 47(3), the Military Staff Committee is responsible for the "strategic
direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art.
47, para. 3 (emphasis added). This language seems to refer to forces that have been assembled
pursuant to Article 43 agreements. Until Article 43 agreements are concluded, forces arguably
have not been "placed at the disposal of the Security Council," and the Military Staff Committee
has no forces over which to exercise "strategic direction." This view is certainly consistent with
Security Council practice in the absence of Article 43 agreements.
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The most obvious answer to this objection is to note that creation
of the strategic council as a subsidiary organ under Article 29 is
consistent with what might be accomplished pursuant to Article 47(3),
under which troop contributing countries could be associated with the
Military Staff Committee, and then constituted as a subcommittee of
the Military Staff Committee. The subcommittee could then be
delegated authority to perform the strategic direction function on
behalf of the Military Staff Committee.
5. Remaking the Military Advisor. Under the framework
described above, the primary role of the proposed Peace and Security
Committee would be to serve as a force planning organ, reporting to
the Security Council through the Secretary General. The proposed
strategic councils would provide strategic advice and direction under
supervision of the Secretary General and Security Council. This
structure, however, lacks a crucial element: with the Peace and
Security Staff providing infrastructure and force planning and a
variety of strategic councils providing strategic advice on particular
operations, the Secretary General would lack a single contact to
coordinate the various sources of military input. Traditionally, the
Secretary General's institutional source of military advice has been
the Military Advisor. It may be argued, however, that if member
states are asked to participate in a United Nations command structure
in which additional authority is vested in the Secretary General,
member states should also have more input into the selection of the
officer who will serve as the primary conduit of military advice
affecting their forces.
An obvious way to guarantee such input would be to have the
Military Advisor approved by the Security Council after nomination
by the Secretary General. This is not the radical step it seems, for it
would merely make the selection process for the Military Advisor
consistent with the selection process for peacekeeping force com-
manders and special representatives.m
In addition, further steps are appropriate. The Security Council,
for example, should mandate that the Military Advisor serve a fixed
two or three year term, which would guarantee continuity of
advice 9 but also ensure a periodic fresh perspective. The Military
287. See DURCH & BLECHMAN, supra note 103, at 68.
288. See supra text accompanying note 119.
289. See Senate Article 43 Hearing, supra note 88, at 40 (statement of Admiral Edney). The
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee is elected by the Chiefs of Staff for a three-year
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Advisor might also be nominated from a Peace and Security Staff
member state and be required to have previous significant United
Nations command experience.' g
These proposals seem appropriate given the anticipated increase
in the Military Advisor's responsibilities. The Military Advisor would
have an opportunity to make final recommendations to the Secretary
General across the range of force planning issues considered by the
Military Staff Committee and would have a right to participate in
strategic council deliberations as well, even though this participation
would be in an advisory capacity only.29' Of necessity, the Military
Advisor, with the assistance of the Peace and Security Staff discussed
earlier, would also fulfill an essential coordinating function between
the Peace and Security Committee and the various strategic councils.
Reform of this type could not be accomplished by Security
Council fiat. The Military Advisor is currently appointed pursuant to
the Secretary General's authority to name Secretariat staff under
regulations established by the General Assembly.29  While the
Secretary General would presumably not yield such a prerogative
lightly, the loss of complete discretion over the Military Advisor's
selection would be accompanied by a considerable gain in overall
authority-a gain that should facilitate this change.
Appendix I demonstrates how the Security Council, the Secretary
General, the Military Advisor, the proposed Peace and Security
Committee and staff, and the strategic councils would be integrated
in a neo-Charter United Nations headquarters model.
6. Maintaining Flexibility in the Selection of Quality Command-
ers. Ironically, the one element of the Charter's original command
and control model that has gained an element of predictability from
years of consistent practice is the method of selecting theater or force
commanders. During the United Nations's large-scale enforcement
operations, commanders have been provided by the United States
with no approval by the United Nations. For peacekeeping opera-
tions, the selection of commanders has consistently been made by the
Secretary General subject to the approval of the Security Council.
term. NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 218, at 339.
290. The requirement of previous United Nations command experience might be waivable
until a large enough pool of experienced commanders is developed.
291. The Military Advisor would also be permitted to participate in meetings between the
chair of a given strategic council and the Secretary General.
292. U.N. CHARTER art. 101, para. 1.
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There seems to be no reason to change the basic practice. If the
United Nations has occasion to rely on the single-state model, it is
appropriate that the state should select its force commander.2' As
force composition becomes more diverse, however, the Secretary
General should make the selection. While it would be helpful to have
an approved roster of commanders from which the Secretary General
could choose,2' the selection of the commander for a particular
operation will depend on the composition of the force as well as the
mission's unique military and political requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the United Nations is to assume greater responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in the era of peace
enforcement, both the United States and the United Nations must
come to terms with present weaknesses in the United Nations's ability
to command and control the military operations conducted in its
name. Recent events suggest some progress in this regard. The
Secretariat has initiated important changes to build an enhanced
headquarters capability with which to oversee its new operations, and
the Clinton Administration supports this progress. In addition,
despite its flaws, the ad hoc command and control arrangements
devised for Somalia demonstrate a vital adaptive capacity within the
United States and United Nations relationship that should serve both
parties well in future operations. While the complete extent of
NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia remains unclear, there
is at least some prospect that a newly energized NATO might serve
both as a multinational manager for future United Nations-authorized
coalitions as well as a multinational vehicle for United States
participation in such operations.
Given the current state of United Nations capabilities and the
inherent difficulty of organizing collective security in a diverse
international organization, it may be that a newly organized NATO
force operating under a United Nations mandate, in addition to an
incrementally reformed peacekeeping bureaucracy, is as much as the
United States or the United Nations can hope for. Before settling on
this approach, however, both the United States and the United
293. But see MacKinlay & Chopra, supra note 134, at 128 (noting that the Security Council
should appoint the commander of a force operating under United Nations mandate, even if it
is designed to meet a situation internal to the regional organization itself).
294. See Norton & Weiss, supra note 268, at 29.
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Nations ought to realize what they will be missing. NATO is not
sufficiently diverse to serve as a substitute for the international
community, and NATO goals will inevitably diverge from United
Nations goals.295 Likewise, NATO is not sufficiently separate from
the United States to shield it from the burdens of fighting and
dying-NATO's battles are likely to remain United States battles.
Neither NATO nor any other existing command and control model
seems likely to remove the inherent tension from a United States and
United Nations relationship in which each party recognizes its need
for the other but continues to find accommodation difficult for fear
that its vital interests will be compromised in the process.
In many respects, the model proposed here is heir to the original
Chapter VII model that envisioned real political authority for the
Security Council and a significant role for the large powers, including
the United States. The new model recognizes, however, that many of
Chapter VII's original assumptions have changed, and that the
maintenance of peace and security is no longer the exclusive province
of the permanent five members.
Because this neo-Charter model of command and control asks
each of its participants to forfeit something, there is no reason to
believe that implementation will be easy. Current Military Staff
Committee members would be asked to accept the potential dilution
of influence inherent in expanded committee membership and
supervision by the Secretary General. Traditional peacekeeping states
would be asked to cooperate with states that have traditionally been
only remotely involved in peacekeeping. The Secretary General
would be asked to rely more heavily on the professional expertise of
the Military Staff Committee and troop contributing states and to
yield control over his or her closest source of professional military
advice. Perhaps most importantly, the United States would be asked
to cede a degree of political and strategic authority to the Security
Council as well as the Secretariat. All of this might lead participants
295. Cf. Frederick Bonnart, A United Nations Command for a New Force, INT'L HERALD
TRiB., Mar. 4, 1993 ("NATO cannot appear to become the world's policeman. This role is
properly that of the United Nations."); Weiss, supra note 145, at 63 ("The United Nations is the
logical convener of future international military operations. Rhetoric about regional
organizations risks slowing down or even making impossible more timely and vigorous action
by the UN, the one organization most likely to fulfil adequately the role of regional conflict
manager.").
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to conclude that this neo-Charter model is "too much, too fast,"
especially if they perceive that ad hoc, informal measures are meeting
current needs.
Even so, a United Nations command and control regime that
allows all participants to contribute to the development of an
important international capacity without compromising their vital
interests is worth the effort in the long term. While we would do well
to realize, as has the Secretary General, that this is "not a time to be
utopian [and] the margin by which the UN can affect critical
situations is narrow," it also seems that "we do not have the luxury
of lowering our sights." 9 As the Secretary General has astutely
observed, and as current events remind us, "We live in a globalized
world. There are needs which only the United Nations can
meet.112
97
296. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 92, at 11.
297. Id.
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APPENDIX I: PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
SECURITY COUNCIL
Secretary General
(Under Secretary General for Peace and Security)*#
Military Advisor+
Peace and Security Committee* Strategic Councils*
U.N. Peace and Security Staff
Staff Director
Force Planning Operations Center
Logistics
Training
Etc.
Special Representative
Force. Commander
* Does not exist.
# Similar to an idea originally proposed by DURCH &BLECHMAN, supra
note 103, at 98.
+ Exists, but nature of position is changed under proposed structure.

